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ERISA: THE SAVINGS CLAUSE, § 502 IMPLIED
PREEMPTION, COMPLETE PREEMPTION, AND

STATE LAW REMEDIES
Donald T. Bogan*
When Congress adopted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),' its members hailed the
legislation as a colossal achievement in consumer protection
designed to reform the private pension industry.! Since that
hopeful beginning, however, ERISA has become more notorious as a shield against consumer interests in the administra* Associate Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Education, University of Oklahoma College of Law; A.B. 1974 Brown University; J.D. 1979 Wake
Forest University School of Law.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (Supp. III
1997) and in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.). A selected history of ERISA, beginning in January 1973 with the introduction of
House Bill 2, H.R. 2, 93d Cong. (1973), and Senate Bill 4, S. 4, 93d Cong. (1973),
the bills which ultimately formed the basis for the final legislation, is compiled
in a three-volume committee print. See 1-3 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RET. INCOME SEC. ACT OF 1974 (Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. For an excellent summary of the social and
political forces that contributed to ERISA's enactment, including legislative efforts in the field of pension benefits prior to 1973, written by Michael S. Gordon,
Former Minority Counsel to the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee,
see SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, U.S. SENATE, 98TH CONG., THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECuRITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 1-25 (Comm.
Print 1984) [hereinafter THE FIRST DECADE].
2. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 29,192, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 4657 (statement of Rep. Perkins); 120 CONG. REC., reprintedin
3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4659 (statement of Rep. Biaggi). See
also Michael S. Gordon, ERISA, ESOPs, and Senator Javits: The Mind of a Reformer, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 3, 3-4 (1988) (describing the 1974 Labor Day signing
ceremony in the White House Rose Garden); Peter H. Turza & Lorraine Halloway, Preemption of State Laws Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 28 CATH. U. L. REV. 163, 163-164 (1979) (citing comments
praising ERISA as the most significant social legislation enacted since the Social Security Act, but also noting criticism of the legislation).
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tion of non-pension employee benefit plans,' rather than notable for the real advances ERISA has implemented in the
pension arena, due to the Supreme Court's early pronouncements on the statute's preemption of state law.4 As a result of
ERISA preemption, AIDS patients who had their health care
benefits canceled, 5 women suffering from breast cancer who
3. ERISA regulates "employee benefit plans." Employee benefit plans include fringe benefit programs provided or available to workers and their beneficiaries through the worker's employment, either from the worker's employer or
union. Employee benefit plans include both "pension" and "welfare" benefit
plans. Welfare benefit plans are any non-pension fringe benefit programs,
whether self-funded by the provider or funded through the purchase of insurance, including health care benefit plans, accident and death benefit plans, and
disability benefit plans.
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare benefit plan"
mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or
vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day
care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services ....
29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1) (1994).
4. See Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Insurance Co., noting that,
ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans. It is
therefore deeply troubling that, in the health insurance context, ERISA
has evolved into a shield of immunity which thwarts the legitimate
claims of the very people it was designed to protect.
984 F. Supp. 49, 56 (D. Mass. 1997) (citations omitted). Similar sentiments
have been voiced:
Every single case brought before this Court has involved insurance
companies using ERISA as a shield to prevent employees from having
the legal redress and remedies they would have had under longstanding state laws existing before the adoption of ERISA. It is indeed
an anomaly that an act passed for the security of the employees should
be used almost exclusively to defeat their security and leave them
without remedies for fraud and overreaching conduct.
Suggs v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 847 F. Supp. 1324, 1357-58 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
By its reading of ERISA's preemption clause, the United States Supreme Court has restricted the very rights of employees ...that Congress sought to protect. Through peculiar federal judicial interpretation, a statutory addition to workers' rights has been converted into a
statutory removal of those rights. The law has been reshaped into a
form that achieves the converse of its original purpose.
Cathey v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex. 1991) (Doggett, J.,
concurring).
5. See Parra v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla.
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had been denied potentially life-saving medical treatment,
and a myriad of other ERISA plan participants with claims
for extra-contractual damages against their plan insurers7
have had their traditional state law remedies nullified, and
the perpetrators of egregious wrongs have not been held accountable.
ERISA contains express preemption language which
Congress detailed in § 514 of the statute.8 Section 514 includes three interrelated passages, known separately as the
preemption clause, the savings clause, and the deemer clause.9
1998); McGann v. H & H Music Co., 742 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990); James R.
Bruner, Note, AIDS and ERISA Preemption: The Double Threat, 41 DUKE L.J.
1115 (1992).
6. See Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir.
1997).
7. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
8. See Kenneth Starr et al., The Law of Preemption, 1991 A.B.A. SEC.
ANTITRUST L. REP. APP. JUDGES CONF. 40-55 (urging Congress to include express preemption language in federal enactments to guide the courts on the intended scope of federal preemption of state law). But see Catherine L. Fisk, The
Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the
Failureof Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 43-46 (1996) (suggesting that
it is fruitless to include express preemption language in federal statutes because
preemption always involves a question of scope and it would be impossible to
precisely define the boundaries of federal preemption in every imaginable circumstance.).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994). ERISA provides in relevant part:
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not
exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect
on January 1, 1975.
(b) Construction and application
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a)
of this title, which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title
(other than a plan established primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan,
shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer,
bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in
the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any
State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
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The preemption clause provides that ERISA "shall supersede
any and all State laws... [that] relate to any employee benefit plan."" The savings clause then exempts from preemption
any state law "which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."" Finally, the deemer clause modifies the effects of the
savings clause by nullifying any state attempt to regulate a
self-insured employee benefit plan as if it were an insurance
company.'2 ERISA's preemption language has become the
bane of practitioners and the courts. 3 The Supreme Court
Id.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).

11. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). To the extent that an employee benefit
plan is funded through the purchase of insurance, the savings clause allows
states to indirectly regulate such plans by regulating the terms of the insurance
policy. The Supreme Court noted,
We are aware that our decision results in a distinction between insured
and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation
while the latter are not. By so doing we merely give life to a distinction
created by Congress in the "deemer clause," a distinction Congress is
aware of and one it has chosen not to alter.
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985). See also FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) ("We read the deemer clause to exempt
self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that 'regulate insurance' within the
meaning of the saving clause.").
13. See Sanson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch,
J., dissenting). Dissenting Circuit Judge Birch captured the feelings of many
judges when he wrote,
I acknowledge the sage observation of the Fifth Circuit... that "any
court forced to enter the ERISA preemption thicket sets out on a
treacherous path." Perhaps I have entered the thicket and lost the
path that my brothers have found and followed. However, if nothing
else is clear it is that the "path" is not; obviously the Supreme Court
needs to do some serious bushhogging in the ERISA preemption
thicket.
Id. at 625 (quoting Gonzales v. Prudential Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 446, 451-52 (5th
Cir. 1990)). In addition to the many thousands of ERISA preemption cases decided by the federal and state courts, legal commentators have produced hundreds of articles addressing ERISA preemption. See, e.g., Karen A. Jordan,
Coverage Denials in ERISA Plans: Assessing the Federal Legislative Solution,
65 Mo. L. REV. 405 (2000); Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the New Jurisprudenceof ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDOzO L. REV. 807
(1999); Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed
Health Care: The Case for Managed Federalism,23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251 (1997);
Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article about the Language of ERISA Preemption?A
Case Study of the Failureof Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS 35 (1996); Karen
A. Jordan, ERISA Pre-emption:IntegratingFabe into the Savings Clause Analysis, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 273 (1996); Daniel C. Schaffer & Daniel M. Fox, SemiPreemption in ERISA: Legislative Process and Health Policy, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y
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has issued no fewer than eighteen opinions dealing with
ERISA preemption, 4 prompting Justice Scalia to comment in
1997 that the Court's continued involvement with the issue
suggests "that our prior decisions have not succeeded in
bringing clarity to the law.""
In a seminal decision illustrative of the Supreme Court's
initial approach to ERISA preemption, the Court ruled in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux16 that ERISA superseded a
plan member's state law cause of action against a plan insurer for extra-contractual damages arising from the alleged
47, 48 (1988); David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A
Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 443-45 (1987). A number of older articles are available. See, e.g., Turza & Halloway, supra note 2;
James D. Hutchinson & David M. Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI.L. REV. 23,
24 (1978); David J. Brummond, Federal Preemption of State InsuranceRegulation under ERISA, 62 IOWA L. REV. 57 (1976).
14. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001); UNUM Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs.
Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316
(1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris [rust &
Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86 (1993); District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of
Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133
(1990); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash,
490 U.S. 107 (1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S.
825 (1988); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
451 U.S. 504 (1981). See also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000); Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514
U.S. 73 (1995); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134 (1985); Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir.
1985), affd sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington Indus. Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1986)
(mem.); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus. Inc., 765 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1985), af/d
mem., 477 U.S. 901 (1986); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983); Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760
(9th Cir. 1980), affd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981); Nachman Corp. v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359 (1980); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435
U.S. 497 (1978). Additionally, the Supreme Court recently granted review in
Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S.Ct. 2589 (June 29, 2001). See infra text accompanying notes
347-77 for discussion of Moran.
15. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
16. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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bad faith denial of a disability benefits claim.'
Applying
ERISA's express preemption language, the Pilot Life Court
held that the plaintiffs state law cause of action "related to"
an ERISA plan, and was not "saved" from preemption as a
law that regulates insurance. Further, the Court suggested,
in very expansive language, that ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions contained in § 502 of the Act 8 impliedly preempt
17. Claims for violation of an insurer's implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing are commonly referred to as "bad faith" claims or claims for "tortious
breach of contract." Additionally, many states have enacted statutory bad faith
provisions that typically appear in the state insurance codes. Though state
statutory provisions vary, I refer to these statutory claims, in general, as "unfair
insurance practices" claims throughout this article. See infra text accompanying notes 107-68 and 188-216.
18. See ERISA's civil enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), which provides as follows:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may be
brought (1) by a participant or beneficiary (A) for the relief provided in subsection (c) of this section [concerning requests to the administrator for information], or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 409 [§ 1109] [breach of fiduciary duty];
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provision of this title or the terms
of the plan;
(4) by the secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate
relief in the case of a violation of 105 (c) [§ 1025(c)] [information to be
furnished to participants];
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the Secretary (A)
to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title;
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under paragraph (2), (4),
(5), or (6) of subsection (c) or under subsection (i) or (1);
(7) by a State to enforce compliance with a qualified medical child support order (as defined in section 609(a)(2)(A) [§ 1169];
(8) by the Secretary, or by an employer or other person referred to in
section 101 ) (1) [§ 1021], to enjoin any act or practice which violates
subsection (f) of section 101 [§ 1021], or (B) to obtain appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce such subsection; or
(9) in the event that the purchase of an insurance contract or insurance
annuity in connection with termination of an individual's status as a
participant covered under a pension plan with respect to all or any por-
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all of a plan participant's state law remedies in any action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits." Since
ERISA's express enforcement provisions do not permit recovery of extra-contractual damages, ERISA's preemption of
state law has often left plan participants without a remedy
for a recognized wrong.2"
Adhering to the Court's initial broad view of ERISA preemption, lower courts have applied ERISA preemption to
nullify a spate of state laws adopted to reform the health care
benefits industry2 and to eliminate plan members' tort remedies in a variety of claims arising from their welfare benefit
plans.22 A number of courts, however, have decried ERISA's
preemption of state law consumer protections as contrary to
23
the statute's remedial purposes and have called for reform.
Though Congress and the President continue to wrangle over
various legislative proposals to cure ERISA's deregulatory ef24
fects in the context of the health care benefits industry, plan
tion of the participant's pension benefit under such plan constitutes a
violation of part 4 of this title [subtitle] or the terms of the plan, by the
Secretary, by any individual who was a participant or beneficiary at
the time of the alleged violation, or by a fiduciary, to obtain appropriate
relief, including the posting of security if necessary, to assure receipt by
the participant or beneficiary of the amounts provided or to be provided
by such insurance contract or annuity, plus reasonable prejudgment interest on such amounts.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). Paragraphs 7-9 were added to § 502 by amendment in
1993.
19. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57 (1987). See implied preemption discussion infra Part III. Throughout this paper I refer to ERISA's express preemption of
state law as "§ 514" preemption and to ERISA's implied preemption of state law
as "§ 502" preemption.
20. See Corcoran v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
See also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (ERISA section
409(a) does not provide a cause of action for extra-contractual damages to a
beneficiary caused by the improper or untimely processing of a benefit claim);
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993). See generally Richard Rouco,
Comment, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section 502, 45 ALA. L. REV. 631
(1994).
21. See Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), affd
mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
22. See Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir.
1996).
23. See Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1321; Parra v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 22 F.
Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984
F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997).
24. On October 7, 1999, the House of Representatives passed the Bipartisan
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participants should be encouraged by a shift in the Court's
perspective on ERISA preemption. In 1995, the Court recognized that its broad "plain meaning"25 interpretation of
ERISA's ambiguous "relates to" preemption language failed to
identify any limits to ERISA's nullification of state law.26
Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723, 106th Cong.
(1999), known commonly as the Norwood-Dingell bill, which would have
amended ERISA to broadly exempt from ERISA preemption state law causes of
action against any person "in connection with the provision of insurance, administrative services, or medical services by such person to or for a group health
plan, or... that arises out of the arrangement by such person for the provision
of such insurance, administrative services, or medical services by other persons." H.R. 2723 § 302(a). The Norwood-Dingle bill passed in the House with
overwhelming bipartisan support, but failed to pass the Senate on four separate
occasions. In the 109th Congress, Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Ted Kennedy
(D-MA), and John Edwards (D-NC) introduced S. 283 as a compromise on the
Norwood-Dingell bill. S. 283 provides for a bifurcated system of federal and
state causes of action, but does allow state law claims to proceed in many circumstances. President Bush indicated that he would veto S. 283 due to the
bill's exemption from preemption for various state law remedies. S. 283 passed
the Senate on June 29, 2001. Rep. Greg Ganske (R-IA) and Rep. John Dingell
(D-MI) offered an identical bill in the House, H.R. 526. The bill was revised as
the Ganske-Dingell-Norwood-Berry "Bipartisan Patient Protection Act", H.R.
2563. A competing bill introduced by Rep. Ernie Fletcher (R-KY) and Rep.
Collin Peterson (D-MN), H.R. 2315, would have preserved most of ERISA's preemption of state law remedies in the field of health care benefit claims. Rep.
Charles Norwood (R-GA) then offered an amendment to H.R. 2563 which significantly gutted the bill's provisions that exempted state law causes of action
from ERISA preemption. H.R. 2563, as amended passed the house on August 2,
2001. At this writing, a House and Senate conference committee is considering
H.R. 2563 and S. 283. However, the events of September 11, 2001, have left
scheduling of the Conference Committee meeting in limbo.
The various proposals for a Patient's Bill of Rights that might amend
ERISA to allow health care benefit plan participants to pursue state law remedies would only apply to ERISA health care benefit plans. ERISA accident,
death, and disability benefit plans will not be affected by the various proposed
amendments to ERISA, even if any of the currently proposed bills are enacted.
Consequently, the Supreme Court's continuing refinement of ERISA preemption
analysis remains vital to consumers in many of their claims arising from their
various employment-provided fringe benefit programs.
25. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), exemplifies the plain
meaning interpretation:
The breadth of § 514 (a)'s preemptive reach is apparent from that section's language. A law "relates to" an employee benefit plan, in the
normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to
such a plan... We must give effect to this plain language unless there
is good reason to believe Congress intended the language to have some
more restrictive meaning.
Id. at 96-97 (citations omitted).
26. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). The Court wrote,
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Following that announcement, the Court has enforced a
stricter construction of ERISA's express preemption clause,
more in conformance with historic federalist principles.2 7
I have recently commented upon the Court's fresh interpretive approach to ERISA's preemption clause that emphasizes respect for state law in areas of traditional state regulation.28 This article now examines the Court's continuing
inclination to uphold state law in welfare plan cases under
29
the Court's newly clarified savings clause formula. This article's review of ERISA's savings clause will focus on state law
remedies that allow consumers to recover extra-contractual
damages when they can prove wrongful conduct by overreaching insurers. ° Because the Court has suggested that
the structure of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions establishes that Congress intended ERISA to preempt state law
remedies, this article will also explore the subtleties of
ERISA's implied preemption of state law under ERISA § 502.
Part I of the article provides some history of ERISA's express preemption language to set the context for the discussion of ERISA's savings clause. Part II then examines, in
depth, the Court's treatment of the savings clause exception
to ERISA preemption, and the emerging trend in the lower
courts to uphold state law bad faith and unfair insurance
practices claims in the face of express ERISA preemption
challenges. In Part III, the article analyzes ERISA's implied
preemption of state law remedies. Finally, in Part IV, the article discusses the issue of federal court removal jurisdiction
under the "complete preemption" doctrine, which often com[Olne might be excused for wondering, at first blush, whether the
words of limitation ("insofar as they ... relate") do much limiting. If
"relate to" were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its
course, for "really, universally, relations stop nowhere,"....
Id. at 655 (citation omitted).
27. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund,
520 U.S. 806 (1997).
28. Donald T. Bogan, Protecting PatientRights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951
(2000).
29. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
30. Extra-contractual damages may include compensatory damages for
wrongful death, loss of consortium, and infliction of emotional distress, or punitive damages and triple damages for particularly aggravated misconduct.
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plicates bad faith and unfair insurance practices claims arising from ERISA welfare benefit plans. The article concludes
that most bad faith and unfair insurance practices claims
against plan insurers should survive ERISA preemption for
the following reasons: 1) unlike the Mississippi bad faith law
at issue in Pilot Life, most state bad faith and unfair insurance practices laws are specifically aimed at the insurance
industry and therefore do regulate insurance within ERISA's
savings clause exception to preemption; and 2) ERISA's express exception to preemption for state laws that regulate insurance, including state remedies laws, trumps implied preemption under ERISA § 502, as a matter of pure statutory
construction.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ERISA's EXPRESS PREEMPTION
LANGUAGE

ERISA's final enactment followed more than a decade of
investigation into the private pension industry.3' In the statute, Congress responded to widespread calls to reform the financial practices of pension plan administrators and to provide greater access to retirement benefits for working
Americans.32
Before ERISA, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act ("WPPDA")33 provided minimal federal regulation of pri-

31. See THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 1. See also S. REP. No. 93-127
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4842-45, and in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 588-93.
32. See THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 1; Bogan, supra note 28, at 964-77.
See also the Report of the House Ways and Means Committee, which states,
This legislation is concerned with improving the fairness and effectiveness of qualified retirement plans in their vital role of providing retirement income. In broad outline, the objective is to increase the
number of individuals participating in employer-financed plans; to
make sure to the greatest extent possible that those who do participate
in such plans actually receive benefits and do not lose their benefits as
a result of unduly restrictive forfeiture provisions or failure of the pension plan to accumulate and retain sufficient funds to meet its obligations; and to make the tax laws relating to qualified retirement plans
fairer by providing greater equality of treatment under such plans for
the different taxpayer groups concerned.
H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 467677.
33. Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997, repealed by
ERISA § 111(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1) (1994).
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vate retirement and other fringe benefit plans.3 4 The WPPDA
imposed reporting and disclosure requirements upon fringe
benefit programs so that consumers could obtain information
concerning the financial practices of plan administrators, but
it did not initiate substantive controls over the administration of benefit plans, or create any kind of enforcement
mechanism to help remedy plan abuses.3 5 Specifically, the
WPPDA did not regulate the funding of retirement plans nor
the administrative practices of plan fiduciaries, and it did not
address concerns that unreasonable vesting requirements
were denying workers their anticipated retirement benefits. 6
Consistent with its limited regulatory function, the WPPDA
included express language preserving state authority to supplement its minimal regulation of the employee benefits industry.37
Following enactment of the WPPDA, retirees continued
to suffer the loss of anticipated benefits due to corporate and
plan financial mismanagement and to extreme participation
requirements.38 In 1970, Congress appointed the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare (the "Subcommittee") to investigate the private pension industry and to identify the causes of pension plan failures and consumer exploitation within the industry.3 9 The
34. See Turza & Halloway, supra note 2, at 172-74. A few states also directly regulated the private pension industry. See id. at 169-74.
35. See THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 1, at 6 ("The theory of the law was
that full disclosure to participants and beneficiaries of the provisions of their
plan and its financial operations would deter abuse ('sunlight being the best
disinfectant') and would enable them to police the plans themselves without requiring greater Government regulations or interference.").
36. See H. R. REP. No. 93-533, at 3-5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4641-43; S.REP. NO. 92-634, at 23-27 (1971); 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 590-93. See generally MERTON C. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF
PRIVATE PENSIONS (1964).

37. See 76 Stat. 35, 29 U.S.C. § 10 (repealed 1974). See also Malone v.
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1978).
38. See S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4841,
and in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 590. See generally RALPH
NADER, YOU AND YOUR PENSION (1973) (describing the Studebaker plant closing in South Bend, Indiana, where approximately 4400 workers lost their
vested retirement benefits).
39. Senate Resolution 360 of the 91st Congress authorized the initial study
by the Subcommittee. See S. REP. No. 92-634, at 1 (1972). See also 119 CONG.
REC. 30,003 (1973), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1598

(statement of Sen. Williams) ("This 3-year study was conducted by the Sub-
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Subcommittee concluded that the WPPDA's failure to cure
abuses in the private pension industry resulted from the
statute's lack of substantive regulatory controls." Rather
than proposing piecemeal amendments to strengthen the
WPPDA, the Subcommittee advocated a new "comprehensive
and reticulated statute" that would contain extensive, substantive regulation of the private pension industry." Led by
Senator Jacob Javits of New York, Congress responded to the
recommendations of the Subcommittee with the passage of
ERISA in 1974.4

ERISA comprehensively regulates the private pension
industry, 3 providing detailed vesting and funding requirements for pension plans4 and a program of pension plan termination insurance. 5 In addition, the statute imposes recommittee on Labor pursuant to three successive resolutions of the Senate, and
was undertaken to ascertain the need for statutory protections for workers' pension programs and to formulate appropriate corrective legislation.").
40. See S. REP. No. 93-127, at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4841,
and in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 590. It was noted,
Experience in the decade since the passage of [the WPPDA] has demonstrated the inadequacy of the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure
Act in regulating the private pension system for the purpose of protecting rights and benefits due to workers. It is weak in its limited disclosure requirements and wholly lacking in substantive fiduciary standards. Its chief procedural weakness can be found in its reliance upon
the initiative of the individual employee to police the management of
his plan.
Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4642, and in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2351 (reciting the
same language as the Senate committee report).
41. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361
(1980).
42. See THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 1, at 10-25; Bogan, supra note 28, at
964-72.
43. Congress was concerned with many abuses in the private pension industry and sought to impose minimum standards within the industry, but Congress
did not seek to require all plans to operate in exactly the same manner. See 113
CONG. REC. 4560-4653 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("I believe all these
problems [with abuses in the private pension industry] are so interrelated that
they cannot be solved without a comprehensive legislative program dealing not
only with the consequences of plant shutdowns, but also with the broad spectrum of questions such as adequacy of funding, reasonable minimum standards
of vesting, transferability of credits under some circumstances, and in short, the
establishment of certain general minimum standards to which all private pensions must conform.").
44. ERISA §§ 201-206, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1086 (1994).
45. In evaluating Congress's intent to preempt state law, it is important to
emphasize that while ERISA comprehensively regulates pension plans, ERISA

2001]

ERISA PREEMPTION

porting and disclosure requirements on both pension and nonpension employee benefit plans, 6 and establishes fiduciary
As
responsibility standards for all plan administrators.
afof
legislation
piece
might be expected with such an ample
fecting the rights and obligations of both big business and labor, ERISA also reflects the reality of political compromise.
One significant provision in the statute that Congress included-and then altered-in an effort to balance competing
political interests was ERISA's preemption language."
As Congress approached the task of reforming the private
pension industry, it faced a significant dilemma. Private pension and retirement programs, offered as fringe benefits by
employers to attract and maintain a competitive work force,
were not mandated by any federal or state law.49 Congress
wanted to encourage employers to continue to offer such voluntary retirement programs, and simultaneously contemplated placing administrative and financial burdens on such
plans in order to insure that anticipated benefits would be
available for covered workers upon retirement."° To lessen
does not comprehensively regulate the field of non-pension employee benefits.
See Bogan, supra note 28, at 973-77.
46. ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031.
47. ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114.
48. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 745 n.23 (1985).
Michael S. Gordon, who was Senator Javits' appointee as minority counsel to
the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee from 1970-1975, has written
several pieces recalling the events surrounding the Conference Committee's last
minute re-write of ERISA's preemption provisions. Mr. Gordon explains in detail, which does not appear in ERISA's legislative history, the political pressures
facing the Conference Committee in attempting to produce a substitute bill that
would pass in both houses, and the compromise that resulted in the changes to
the preemption language. See Michael S. Gordon, The History of ERISA's Preemption Provision and Its Bearing on the Current Debate Over Health Systems
Reforms, Remarks at the National Health Policy Forum's Conference on "The
Role of Federal Standards in Health Systems Reform: How Much Leash Should
ERISA Give the States?" (November 18, 1992) (describing three problem areas
that contributed to the alteration of ERISA's preemption language); Michael S.
Gordon, Health Reform and ERISA Preemption After the Travelers DecisionDefining the Role of the States, Remarks at the George Washington University
Health Policy Forum's Conference on "Health Systems Financing After the
Travelers Case" (July 21, 1995) (referring to the Conference Committee action
expanding ERISA's preemption language as "a Congressional act of political expediency"). See also Bogan, supra note 28, at 983-85.
49. See generally S. REP. No. 93-127 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4838, and in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 587-623.
50. See S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 11-13, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N at 4848-
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ERISA's regulatory impediments, Congress drafted the statute with the intent that ERISA would provide a single, comprehensive set of rules to govern the private pension industry,
thereby relieving large employers from the headache of complying with multiple and divergent state and local regulations
in the administration of their retirement plans.5
Consistent with this intent, both House bill H.R. 2 and
Senate bill S. 4, the bills that formed the basis for ERISA as
finally enacted, included express preemption language reserving exclusive federal authority over the subjects regulated by the statute. Consequently, as first approved in both
the House and the Senate, ERISA would have superseded
state laws related to reporting and disclosure requirements
and fiduciary responsibility standards for all ERISA plans,
and state laws affecting vesting and funding requirements for
pension plans." However, neither the House-passed version
of ERISA's preemption language, nor the Senate-passed version, as originally drafted, would have had a significant impact on welfare plan participants' state law claims because
the subjects comprehensively regulated by ERISA do not significantly impact non-pension employee benefit plan partici50, and in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 597-99.
51. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) ("Section
514(a) was intended to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to
a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and
financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal government. Otherwise, the inefficiencies created
could work to the detriment of plan beneficiaries."). Congress's overriding intent in enacting ERISA is clear from ERISA's preamble, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)
(1994), and the statute's legislative history. The purpose of ERISA is to promote the private pension industry and to protect employee rights to their private pension benefits. An ancillary intent was to make the world of pension
regulation uniform, in order to encourage employers to continue to provide such
benefits. Congress provided uniform regulation of the pension industry for fear
that if the industry was over-regulated, it might work to hurt consumers by
causing employers to abandon the benefit.
52. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong. § 114 (1973), reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 8860
(1974), and in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 50-51; S. 4, 93d Cong. §
609 (1973), reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 8860 (1974), and in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4272. See also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85,
98 (1983).
53. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong. § 514 (1974), reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 8860
(1974), and in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4057-58; H.R. 2, 93d
Cong. § 699 (1974), reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 8860 (1974), and in 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 3820. See also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 745 n.23 (1985).
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pant claims. 4 Unfortunately, ERISA's Conference Committee, influenced by various lobbying interests, significantly expanded ERISA's preemption language by enlarging the field
of laws superseded by ERISA from state laws governing the
specific subjects regulated by the statute to "any and all State
laws that ... relate to" any ERISA plan, regardless of
whether ERISA itself regulated the subject area. 5 The Conference Committee action occurred very shortly before President Ford signed ERISA into law, and set the stage for what
Justice Stevens has called an "avalanche" of litigation focused
on defining the boundaries of ERISA's exclusive field of
regulation.5 6
When the Supreme Court first explored the interaction
between ERISA's preemption clause and savings clause in
5 7 the Court
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,
found no guidance in ERISA's legislative history concerning
the intended scope of the savings clause. The Court commented, "There is no discussion in ERISA's legislative history
of the relationship between the general pre-emption clause
and the savings clause, and indeed very little discussion of
the savings clause at all." 8 Prior to the Conference Committee action, the savings clause appeared as a non-controversial
appendage to ERISA's preemption language, apparently included to assure that state insurance, banking, and securities
laws would continue to govern pension plan investment
transactions. 9 However, as courts applied the expanded pre54. See Bogan, supra note 28, at 964-77.
55. See id. at 977-85.
56. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 808
n.1 (1997). Ironically, one of the reasons Senator Javits listed for expanding
ERISA's preemption language was to reduce litigation. See 120 CONG. REC.
29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4770-71
("Both House and Senate bills provided for preemption of State law, but ... defined the perimeters of preemption in relation to the areas regulated by the bill.
Such a formulation raised the possibility of endless litigation over the validity of
State action that might impinge on Federal regulation, as well as opening the
door to multiple and potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal
with some particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans not
clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme.").
57. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
58. Id. at 745.
59. Every draft version of ERISA's preemption language included a savings
clause that preserved state regulation of insurance. See S. 3589, 91st Cong. §
14 (1970), reprinted in 116 CONG. REC. 7284 (1970). See also Metro. Life Ins.
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emption clause to create a regulatory vacuum, nullifying state
laws even where ERISA did not substitute federal safeguards,
the role of the savings clause in preserving state law consumer protections unexpectedly grew in prominence."
II. THE "SAVINGS CLAUSE" EXCEPTION TO ERISA
PREEMPTION

A.

The Supreme Court Identifies a "Savings Clause" Test
Early in the history of ERISA preemption litigation, the
Supreme Court observed that ERISA's express language creates a difficult tension between the preemption clause and
the savings clause. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Massachusetts,"'Justice Blackmun wrote,
The two pre-emption sections, while clear enough on their
faces, perhaps are not a model of legislative drafting, for
while the general pre-emption clause broadly pre-empts
state law, the savings clause appears broadly to preserve
the States' lawmaking power over much of the same
regulation. While Congress occasionally decides to return
to the States what it has previously taken away, it does
not normally do both at the same time.62
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S 724, 745 (1985). Additionally, ERISA preserves
the McCarran-Ferguson Act directive that insurance regulation shall remain
primarily with the states. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d). See generally Bogan, supra
note 28, at 955 n.16.
60. See Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 745 ("[Tlhere is no indication in the legislative history that Congress was aware of the prominence given the savings
clause in light of the rewritten preemption clause, or was aware that the savings clause was in conflict with the general pre-emption provision."). In a footnote reference, the MetropolitanLife Court explained further,

The Conference Committee that was convened to work out differences

between the Senate and House versions of ERISA broadened the general pre-emption provision from one that pre-empted state laws only
insofar as they regulated the same areas explicitly regulated by ERISA,
to one that pre-empts all state laws unless otherwise saved. The
change gave the insurance saving clause a much more significant role,
as a provision that saved an entire body of law from the sweeping general pre-emption clause. There were no comments on the floor of either
Chamber specifically concerning the insurance saving clause, and
hardly any concerning the exceptions to the pre-emption clause in general.
Id. at 745 n.23.
61. 471 U.S. 724.
62. Id. at 739.
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"Fully aware of this statutory complexity," the Court proceeded to identify guidelines to mark the boundary between
state and federal authority under the savings clause exception to ERISA preemption.63
In Metropolitan Life, the Massachusetts Attorney General sued various insurers in state court to enforce a state
statute requiring health care plans covering Massachusetts
residents to provide a minimum level of mental health benefits.64 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and other group
insurance providers who sold health insurance policies to employee benefit plans, absent the mental health coverage,
maintained that ERISA superseded the mandated benefits
law because the state law "related to" ERISA plans under
ERISA § 514(a).65 Massachusetts argued, in turn, that the
mental health law was exempt from ERISA preemption because it was a law that "regulates insurance" within the
meaning of ERISA's savings clause (§ 514(b)(2)(A)).66
Providing definition to the phrase "regulates insurance,"
the Metropolitan Life Court crafted a savings clause test that
included both a common-sense component6 7 and a specific list
of factors borrowed from cases interpreting the "business of
insurance" language contained in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.68 The three McCarran-Ferguson Act factors identified by
63. Id. at 740.
64. See id. at 734.
65. See id. at 734-35.
66. The state law did not distinguish between insured and self-funded
health care plans; however, the Massachusetts Attorney General never attempted to enforce the mandated benefits law against self-funded plans, conceding that that self-funded plans were not subject to the savings clause exception to ERISA preemption due to the application of ERISA's deemer clause. Id.
at 735 n.14.
67. Id. at 740.
68. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1945). The McCarranFerguson Act provides as follows:
§ 1011. Declaration of policy
The Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public
interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
§1012. Regulation by State law; Federal law relating specifically to insurance; applicability of certain Federal laws after June 30, 1948
(a) State regulation. The business of insurance, and every person
engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
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the Court as relevant to the definition of state laws that
regulate the business of insurance are 1) whether the practice
affects the spreading of policyholder risk, 2) whether the
practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between
the insurer and the insured, and 3) whether the state law
specifically targets the insurance industry.69
In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court held that the
Massachusetts mental health mandated benefits law did
regulate insurance, both as a common-sense matter and under each of the three McCarran-Ferguson Act factors." However, because the Massachusetts statute met all of the relevant considerations, it was not necessary for the Metropolitan
Life Court to elaborate on whether the common-sense test
carried more or less weight than the McCarran-Ferguson Act
criteria, or whether each of the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors must be satisfied to define a state law as one that regulates insurance.'
The three factors test cited by the Metropolitan Life
Court arose in a pair of cases exploring the extent to which
insurance companies might be exempt from antitrust liability
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.72 Given the context of the
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business."
(b) Federal regulation. No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance,or which imposes a
fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance: Provided, that after June 30, 1948,
the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act
[15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.], and the Act of October 15, 1914, as
amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26,
1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended
[15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq.], shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
law.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012 (emphasis added).
69. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 743 (quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno,
458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)).
70. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 743. The Court found that the mandated benefits law was intended to effectuate the Massachusetts legislative judgment that
the risk of mental-health care should be shared. Further, the law directly
regulated an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship by limiting the
type of insurance that an insurer may sell to the policyholder, and by mandating the content of the insurance policy. Finally, by definition, the statute only
applied to the insurance industry. Id.
71. Id.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (b); see Union Labor, 458 U.S. at 129 (Insurance com-

2001]

ERISA PREEMPTION

antitrust cases, the Supreme Court noted that the statutory
phrase "regulates the business of insurance" must be construed narrowly when an insurance company is relying on the
undefined phrase as a basis to avoid the proscriptions of a
consumer protection statute.73 Though the Court in MetropolitanLife employed the three factor criteria to help define a
law that "regulates insurance" under ERISA's savings clause,
it expressly rejected an industry argument that ERISA's
savings clause should be construed narrowly.74 In ERISA,
where the savings clause presents an exception to preemption, the Metropolitan Life Court held that the phrase "regulates insurance" should be construed broadly both to promote
the presumption in favor of the validity of state laws that
regulate areas of traditional state interests, and to preserve
state consumer protection laws. "
pany and Chiropractor Association that set up peer review committee to review
chiropractor bills, were sued for antitrust violations by an individual chiropractor); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979)
(holding that agreement between pharmacy and HMO setting prices for preSee also Cmty. Health
scription drugs was not the business of insurance).
Partners, Inc. v. Kentucky, 14 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1004 (W.D. Ky. 1998) ("[The
Royal Drug Court emphasized that quite different questions are raised by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act's exemption of the business of insurance from antitrust
laws and by its preservation of state regulation of the activities of insurance
companies.") (quotations and citations omitted); Karen A. Jordan, ERISA Preemption: Integrating Fabe into the Savings Clause Analysis, 27 RUTGERS L.
REV. 273 (1996) (arguing persuasively that interpretation of the several "business of insurance" phrases in §§ 1011, 1012 (a), and § 1012 (b) should be accorded different presumptions). Cf U.S. Dept. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S.
491 (1993); SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
73. See Group Life, 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979) ("It is well settled that exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed. This doctrine is not
limited to implicit exemptions from the antitrust laws, but applies with equal
force to express statutory exemptions.") (citations omitted); Union Labor, 458
U.S. at 126 ("[O]ur precedents consistently hold that exemptions from the antitrust laws must be construed narrowly.").
74. See Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 746 ("We ...decline to impose any limitation on the savings clause beyond those Congress imposed in the clause itself
and in the 'deemer' clause which modifies it ...Nothing in the language, structure, or legislative history of the Act supports a more narrow reading of the
[savings] clause...") For further detail, see the Court's extended discussion,
including a review of the Massachusetts Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions, leading to its conclusion that the savings clause should not be
construed narrowly. Id. at 735-47. See also infra text accompanying notes 9194, 166-68, comparing Metropolitan Life's broad construction of the savings
clause to the PilotLife Court's narrow reading of the savings clause.
75. See Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 741 ("The presumption is against preemption, and we are not inclined to read limitations into federal statutes in or-
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B.

Pilot Life Limits the Savings Clause and Adds Implied
Preemption to the ERISA Mix
The Supreme Court's next application of the savings
clause arose when an insured ERISA welfare benefit plan denied a plan participant's claim for disability benefits. The
plaintiff in Pilot Life Insurance Company v. Dedeaux76 filed a
diversity jurisdiction action in federal court seeking punitive
damages from the plan insurer under Mississippi common
law due to the insurer's alleged bad faith in processing
Dedeaux's claim." Pilot Life Insurance Company asserted
that ERISA superseded Dedeaux's bad faith cause of action
because the state law claim "related to" an employee benefit
plan under ERISA's express preemption clause."8 Dedeaux
invoked ERISA's savings clause to avoid the insurer's preemption argument."
Expanding on the Metropolitan Life savings clause discussion, 'the Supreme Court in Pilot Life determined that
Mississippi's common law remedy for tortious breach of contract was not a law that regulates insurance under a common-sense view.8 ° The Court explained that a law which
"regulates" a particular industry "must be specifically directed toward that industry."8' Since the Mississippi bad
der to enlarge their pre-emptive scope."). Compare with the dissent in the Massachusetts Supreme Court opinion suggesting that the savings clause should be
construed narrowly to promote uniformity. Attorney Gen. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
463 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Mass. 1984) (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
76. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
77. Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1311, 1313 (5th Cir. 1985). In
addition to his bad faith cause of action, Dedeaux also asserted a state law
breach of contract claim. Apparently conceding that the breach of contract
claim did relate to an ERISA plan and was not saved from preemption, Dedeaux
only pursued his bad faith claim in the Supreme Court. Dedeaux sued only the
plan insurer and presented only state law claims in his complaint. See Pilot
Life, 481 U.S. at 43-44.
78. See Dedeaux, 770 F.2d at 1313.
79. Id. at 1314.
80. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50. The insurance company prevailed on summary judgment motion at the district court; however, MetropolitanLife had not
yet been decided at the time the district court ruled. See Dedeaux, 770 F.2d at
1314-15. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, relying on the
savings clause test subsequently announced in MetropolitanLife. Id. at 1314.
81. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50 ("A common-sense view of the word 'regulates'
would lead to the conclusion that in order to regulate insurance, a law must not
just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed
toward that industry.").
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faith remedies law applied to all Mississippi contracts, not
just insurance contracts,82 it did not regulate insurance as a
matter of common-sense.8 3 Applying the McCarran-Ferguson
Act factors, the Court then determined that Mississippi's bad
faith law did not affect the spreading of policyholder risk,84
and as discussed under the common sense test, it was not
limited in its application under Mississippi precedents to the
insurance industry.8 5 While the Court acknowledged that the
remedies law did impact the inisurer-insured relationship to
some degree,86 the Court stated that meeting one prong of the
82. Id. ("Even though the Mississippi Supreme Court has identified its law
of bad faith with the insurance industry, the roots of this law are firmly planted
in the general principles of Mississippi tort and contract law. Any breach of
contract, and not merely breach of an insurance contract, may lead to liability
for punitive damages under Mississippi law.").
83. Cf.Lewis v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 78 F. Supp: 2d 1202 (N.D. Okla. 1999)
(distinguishing Pilot Life because Oklahoma's bad faith remedy only applies to
the insurance industry).
84. Cf.Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 743-44. The Court explained,
Congress was concerned [in the McCarran-Ferguson Act] with the
types of state regulation that centers around the contract of insurance ... The relationship between insurer and insured, the type of

policy which could be issued, its reliability, its interpretation, and enforcement-these were the core of the "business of insurance." [Tihe
focus [of the statutory term] was on the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder. Statutes aimed at protecting or
regulating this relationship, directly or indirectly, are laws regulating
the "business of insurance."
Id. (quoting SEC v. Nat'l Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969)).
85. In UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999), the Supreme Court
expounded further on the common-sense definition of a law that regulates insurance. Id. at 368-73. However, it remains unclear whether the commonsense definition requires that a law apply exclusively to the insurance industry,
or merely that the law be directed specifically at the insurance industry. It
seems that a law could be specifically directed at the insurance industry, plus
some other industry. For example, a state law might establish that all claims
against an insurance company and all claims against any medical provider be
filed within one year of the date of injury. Would such a statute of limitations
regulate insurance under the common-sense test? See Hobbs v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Ala., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1307-08 (M.D. Ala. 2000). Cf.Metro.
Life, 471 U.S. 724 (state mandated benefits law that by its terms applied to both
insured and uninsured plans was a law that regulates insurance under a common-sense view; however, the law was not applied to self-funded ERISA plans
due to the application of the deemer clause).
86. The Pilot Life Court acknowledged that the bad faith law affected the
insurer-insured relationship, but termed the effect "attenuated at best." Pilot
Life, 481 U.S. at 50-51. The Court wrote,
In contrast to the mandated-benefits law in Metropolitan Life, the
common law of bad faith does not define the terms of the relationship
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McCarran-Ferguson Act test did not save Mississippi's bad
faith law from ERISA preemption."
As an important aside, the Pilot Life Court found support
for its expansive view of ERISA preemption in the legislative
history and structure of ERISA § 502, the civil enforcement
provisions.8 8 ERISA § 502 details specific remedies that are
available to identified persons or entities under the statute.89
Section 502 does not contain any express preemption language, but the Court agreed with the United States Solicitor
General's suggestion, appearing as a friend of the court in Pilot Life, that ERISA's carefully drawn enforcement provisions
indicated that Congress intended § 502 to provide "the exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants... asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits." °
The Supreme Court's holding in Pilot Life was fairly narrow. The Court found that Mississippi's bad faith remedies
between the insurer and the insured; it declares only that, whatever
terms have been agreed upon in the insurance contract, a breach of
that contract may in certain circumstances allow the policyholder to obtain punitive damages. The state common law of bad faith is therefore
no more "integral" to the insurer-insured relationship than any State's
general contract law is integral to a contract made in that State.
Id. at 51.
87. Id. at 51.
88. Id. at 52. The Court stated,
In sum, the detailed provisions of § 502 (a) set forth a comprehensive
civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the
need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the
public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans.
The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the
exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.
Id. at 54.
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994). See supra note 18 for the complete text of
ERISA § 502.
90. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52; see Brief of Amicus Curie the United States at
18-19, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, p. 4, at 18-19 (1987) (No. 851043) ("[W]e think that Congress intended ERISA's provisions relating to enforcement of participants' rights under benefit plans to be exclusive."). See also
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985) ("We are reluctant
to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the
one in ERISA."). The Court continued, "The presumption that a remedy was
deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a
comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures
for enforcement." Id. (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers,
451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981)).
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law, which was not directed at the insurance industry, was
not saved from ERISA preemption as a law that regulates insurance.9' The language in the opinion and the rationale for
the Court's holding, however, were much broader. Pilot Life
modified the preemption analysis announced in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts in two interrelated and
significant ways. First, the Pilot Life Court distinguished
Metropolitan Life based upon the nature of the state laws at
issue in the two cases.92 Because the state law involved in Pilot Life provided an alternative remedy to those outlined in
ERISA, the Court felt that the bad faith law conflicted with
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions and suggested, therefore, that ERISA impliedly preempted the remedies law.93
Second, the Pilot Life Court construed the savings clause narrowly, despite the Metropolitan Life precedent that clearly
rejected such a narrow construction, because the Court inferred a broad overall congressional intent 9to preempt from
4
the structure and legislative history of § 502.
The Pilot Life Court cited comments from ERISA's spon91. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 376 (1998). "[Pilot Life]
concerned a Mississippi common law creating a cause of action for bad faith
breach of contract, [a] law not specifically directed to the insurance industry
and therefore not saved from ERISA preemption." Id. at 376 n.7.
92. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56-57.
93. See id. at 57.
94. The Pilot Life Court stated,
[Tihe Court had no occasion to consider in Metropolitan Life the question raised in the present case: whether Congress might clearly express, through the structure and legislative history of a particular substantive provision of ERISA, an intention that the federal remedy
provided by that provision displace state causes of action. Our resolution of this different question does not conflict with the Court's earlier
general observations in MetropolitanLife.
Id. Despite the Pilot Life Court's suggestion that it looked to the entire statute
in order to discern Congress's preemptive intentions, the Court deduced a broad
intent to preempt solely by looking to ERISA § 502. Inferring a broad intention
to preempt from ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, the Court used that inference to justify a narrow reading of ERISA's savings clause:
Considering the common-sense understanding of the savings clause,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors defining the business of insurance,
and, most importantly, the clear expression of congressional intent that
ERISA's civil enforcement scheme be exclusive, we conclude that
Dedeaux's state law suit asserting improper processing of a claim for
benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan is not saved by § 514 (b) (2)
(A), and therefore is pre-empted by § 514 (a).
Id. See also Bogan, supra note 28, at 994-95.
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sors 95 and specific passages in the Conference Committee Report in support of its narrow reading of ERISA's savings
clause.96 The legislative history indicated that Congress modeled ERISA's civil enforcement provisions on § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).97 Section 301 of the
LMRA provides that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees
in an industry affecting commerce... may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties. ... "98 Construing § 301 in a series of cases culminating in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International
Ass'n of Machinists," the Supreme Court had previously established that suits "alleging a violation of a labor contract
must be brought under § 301 and be resolved by reference to
federal law."1 °° Consequently, in Avco, the Supreme Court de95. For example, "[t]he uniformity of decision which the Act is designed to
foster will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to predict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity of reference to varying state laws."
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 12 (1973), reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2359). "[S]uits involving claims for

benefits 'will be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in
similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act."' Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56 (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 29,933
(1974) (statement of Sen. Williams). "It is also intended that a body of Federal
substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving
rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." Pilot Life, 481
U.S. at 56 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 22,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits).
96. The Court adopted the following:
Under the conference agreement, civil actions may be brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due under the plan, to clarify
rights to receive future benefits under the plan, and for relief from
breach of fiduciary responsibility ... [w]ith respect to suits to enforce
benefit rights under the plan or to recover benefits under the plan
which do not involve 'application of the title I provisions, they may be
brought not only in U.S. district courts but also in State courts of competent jurisdiction. All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar
fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947.
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 55 (quoting H. R. CONG. REP. No. 93-1280, at 327 (1974),
reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038 and in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note

1, at 4277-655).
97. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994)).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
99. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
100. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985) (citing Local
174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)).
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cided that any "action arising under § 301 is controlled by
federal substantive law even though it is brought in state
court"'' and may be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C
§ 1441 (b). 102 The Pilot Life Court observed that Congress was
well aware of the very broad preemptive effect granted by the
LMRA under § 301, and that the references in ERISA's legislative history to that provision demonstrated Congress's intent to emulate that broad preemption of state law remedies
when it drafted ERISA § 502.0
Given the Supreme Court's tone in Pilot Life and the
Court's generally expansive view toward ERISA preemption
0
exhibited in the Court's early ERISA cases, it is not surprising that the majority of lower court decisions following Pilot Life concluded that ERISA preempts all manner of state
With the Sucommon law and statutory bad faith claims.'
101. Avco, 390 U.S. at 560.
102. Under the Avco or "complete preemption" doctrine, which is a corollary
to the well-pleaded complaint rule, courts recast state law causes of action to
state a federal claim for relief. See discussion accompanying infra Part IV.
103. The similarities between ERISA § 502 and § 301 of the LMRA for purposes of preemption analysis are not so pure as Pilot Life suggests. The United
States Solicitor General, who initiated the view seized upon by the Pilot Life
Court that Congress intended § 502 to provide the exclusive remedy for claims
within the scope of § 502, later clarified this view in a case involving a state law
that regulated insurance under ERISA's savings clause, emphasizing the fact
that unlike § 502, LMRA § 301 is not limited by any express savings clause. See
Brief of Amicus Curie the United States at 377, UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward,
526 U.S. 358 (1999) (No. 97-1868). See UNUM Life, 526 U.S. at 377 n.7. The
Avco doctrine applies a frustration brand of conflict preemption, not field preemption. If ERISA § 502 likewise was not intended to occupy the field of all
remedies under ERISA, but merely to preempt state laws that conflict with the
statutes remedial purpose, it is arguable that Congress did not intend to preempt state law consumer protection remedies that complement and supplement
ERISA's civil enforcement scheme. See Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299
(1999) (holding that McCarran-Ferguson Act does not preclude enforcement of
federal RICO claim because RICO remedies complement, rather than conflict
with, state law); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (holding
that state law remedies supplement federal remedies under the Atomic Energy
Act).
104. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
105. Prior to Pilot Life the lower federal courts were split on the extent to
which ERISA's saving clause preempted plan participants' bad faith claims
against ERISA plan insurers. For example, in Eversole v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
500 F. Supp. 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1980), a federal district court in California found
that a plaintiffs state law bad faith claim was saved from preemption because
the applicable state remedies law regulated insurance. In Hoeflicker v. Cent.
States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 644 F. Supp. 195
(W.D. Mo. 1986), a federal district court held that plaintiffs claim under Mis-
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preme Court's change of emphasis in ERISA preemption since
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Insurance Co.,106 however, it is worthwhile to reexamine some of these bad faith and unfair insurance practices cases to determine whether the rationale supporting
preemption can still be defended.
C.

Bad Faith and Unfair InsurancePracticesClaims
Following Pilot Life
As illustrated by the Pilot Life opinion, the historical underpinnings of state law bad faith claims can significantly
impact the savings clause analysis and direct whether such a
state law remedy will be preempted by ERISA as a law that
regulates insurance. Several different types of bad faith and
unfair insurance practices claims and remedies exist in the
various states."°7 The state bad faith law at issue in Pilot Life
was unusual in that the common law remedy, which applied
to the insurance industry, could also attach to any breach of
contract claim under Mississippi law.0 8 The Pilot Life Court
relied upon the multidisciplinary nature of the Mississippi
remedy to hold that the law did not regulate insurance under
a common-sense view because it was not aimed specifically at
the insurance industry. 09
In most states, the common law remedy of bad faith
breach of contract specifically targets the insurance industry.110 Additionally, many states have enacted numerous
types of unfair insurance practices statutes that apply exclusively to insurance companies."' These statutes, typically
contained within the insurance law chapters of the various
souri's unfair insurance practices statute was a law that both related to ERISA,
and regulated insurance, but was still preempted because the plan defendant
was self-insured and could not be deemed to be an insurance company. Id. at
200.
106. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
107. See generally STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND
DAMAGES (2d ed. 1997).
108. See id. § 1:02, at 1-4 ("For the most part... the attempt to extend the
bad faith tort beyond the insurance realm has fizzled."); id. §§ 11:01-11:07.
109. UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 377 n.7 (1999).
110. See, e.g., Lewis v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (N.D.
Okla. 1999) (citing Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla.
1978)). See discussion accompanying infra notes 188-216.
111. See ASHLEY, supra note 107, § 9:02, at 9-3 to 9-5 & n.22.
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state codes," 2 often provide consumers a private right of action against an insurance company and allow a successful
plaintiff to recover extra-contractual damages when an insurer's behavior toward the insured is particularly egregious." Many of the state unfair insurance practices statutes, however, may only be enforced by the state
Commissioner of Insurance or Attorney General."' Finally,
some states allow private parties to enforce their unfair insurance practices statute, either expressly or impliedly,
through the remedies provided in the state's separate Unfair
and Deceptive Trade Practices statute."' Depending upon the
peculiarities of each of the various state law bad faith and unfair insurance practices remedies, the Pilot Life savings
clause analysis may or may not directly govern whether the
state law "regulates insurance" within the meaning of
ERISA's savings clause.
Co., 16
In Anschultz v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether
ERISA preempted a state law claim, arising from an insured
ERISA disability benefits plan, under Florida's unfair insurance practices statute." ' Unlike Pilot Life, the statute at issue in Anschultz applied only to the insurance industry."'
112. See Anschultz v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 1467, 1468-69 (11th
Cir. 1988); Hobbs v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1299,
1307 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (argument that state law regulates insurance merely because it is codified in the state insurance code is "overly simplistic").
113. See ASHLEY, supra note 107, § 9:02, at 9-3 to 9-10 & n.38.
114. See id. at 9-16 & n.39. See, e.g., Lewis, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1205-06 (citing
Gianfillippo v. Northland Cas. Co., 861 P.2d 308, 310 (Okla. 1993) (explaining
that Oklahoma Unfair Settlement Practices Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1250.1 et
seq. (1999), does not provide a private right of action; however, the statute is
enforceable by the Commissioner of Insurance, who may issue cease and desist
orders to insurers, suspend or revoke an insurer's certificate of authority, and
subject an insurer to civil penalties).
115. See Ramirez v. Inter-Cont'l Hotels, 890 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1989) (Texas
statute); Miller v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 435 S.E.2d 537, 542-43 (N.C. App.
1993) (North Carolina's general unfair trade practices statute provides insured's
private remedy for violation of Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act).
116. 850 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1988).
117. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 624.155 (2001) (The statute provides a civil
remedy, including a punitive damages remedy in certain specified circumstances, for an insurer's bad faith failure to pay legitimate claims, or failure to
promptly settle claims after it becomes reasonably clear that the claims are
payable, or for other common unfair claims settlement practices).
118. Anschultz, 850 F.2d at 1468-69.
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The court held that even though the Florida statute was directed at the insurance industry, thereby satisfying the common-sense test and one of the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors, the unfair insurance practices law did not regulate
insurance under the Pilot Life formula because the Florida
law failed to meet the other two prongs of McCarranFerguson Act test.1 9
Addressing the three factors test, the Eleventh Circuit
observed that the Florida unfair insurance practices law did
not spread policyholder risk.2 Further, the Anschultz Court
found that the Florida law did not affect an integral part of
the insurer-insured policy relationship because it did not
mandate specific coverages or define any terms of the plan. 2 '
Interestingly, Anschultz relied upon language in the Pilot Life
opinion to conclude that a state law, which provided tort
remedies for the egregious breach of an insurance contract,
did not affect an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured.'22 The Pilot Life Court declared that Mississippi's bad faith law "may be said to concern" the insurer-insured policy relationship,'23 and assumed
for the purposes of the savings clause analysis that Mississippi's common law bad faith claim did affect an integral part
of that relationship.' However, the Anschultz Court was correct in reading the Pilot Life opinion as not fully supporting
119. The court stated,
[W]e acknowledge... that a "common-sense" understanding of the
savings clause indicates that Section 624.155 arguably regulates insurance: the statute is specifically directed toward the insurance industry
since the statute is codified in the Chapter of the Florida Statutes entitled Insurance Code & Administrationand GeneralProvisions and provides civil remedies against an insurer when a claimant is damaged by
various actions of the insurer....
Id. Because the savings clause analysis depends on the nature and historical
context of the state law at issue, circuit court preemption opinions involving different state bad faith laws might vary within the circuit according to the peculiarities of the particular state laws underlying the bad faith preemption decision.
See generally ASHLEY, supra note 107.
120. Anschultz, 850 F.2d at 1469.
121. Id. at 1468-69 (noting that statute merely provides a remedy for any
breach of the contract terms).
122. Id.
123. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1987).
124. Id. at 51 ("[Tlhe Mississippi common law of bad faith at most meets one
of the three criteria used to identify the 'business of insurance' under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act ....).
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the integral policy relationship portion of the McCarranFerguson Act test. In Pilot Life the Supreme Court also
stated that
whatever terms have been agreed upon in the insurance
contract, a breach of that contract may in certain circumstance allow the policyholder to obtain punitive damages.
The state common law of bad faith is therefore no more
"integral" to the insurer-insured relationship than any
State's general25contract law is integral to a contract made
in that State.
Since the Pilot Life Court assumed that Mississippi's bad
faith law did impact an integral part of the insurer-insured
policy relationship, it would be wrong to place too much
weight on Pilot Life's less enthusiastic dicta. State bad faith
laws, and particularly state unfair insurance practices statutes, certainly do more than provide a punitive damages remedy. Bad faith laws establish and define a standard of care
owed by the insurer to the insured that attaches to every insurance policy. Typically, unfair insurance practices statutes
list detailed procedures incumbent upon insurers to follow in
the settlement of claims,1 26 including such things as a requirement for timely investigation and settlement of claims. 27
In UNUM Life Insurance Co. v. Ward,128 the Supreme Court
125. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 51.
[Mississippi's] common law of bad faith does not define terms of the
relationship between the insurer and the insured; it declares only
that, whatever the terms have been agreed upon in the insurance
contract, a breach of that contract may in certain circumstance allow the policyholder to obtain punitive damages.
See Anschultz, 850 F.2d at 1468) (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 51). See Smith
v. Jefferson Pilot Life Ins. Co., 14 F.3d 562, 570 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he contours
of the second [McCarran-Ferguson Act] criteria [substantially affecting an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship] are somewhat vague .... ").
126. See, e.g., Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §
1250.1, et seq. (West 2000).
127. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit 36. § 1250.5 (3) (1999) ("Failing to adopt and
implement reasonable standard for prompt investigation of claims arising under
insurance policies or insurance contracts."); § 1250.5 (4) ("Not attempting in
good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear."). See also ASHLEY, supra
note 107, § 9:06, at 9-23 to 9-27 (identifying specific prohibitions contained
within the model Uniform Unfair Claims Settlements Practices Act, as
amended, originally drafted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and adopted in some form by the vast majority of states).
128. 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
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held that ERISA saved from preemption California's common
law rule requiring an insurance company to establish prejudice before the insurer denied a late-filed claim.'29 The Court
in UNUM found that the notice-prejudice rule served as an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer
and the insured because it effectively created a mandatory
contract term.'3 ° Similarly, state unfair insurance practices
statutes, incorporated into every insurance contract,13 ' effectively create mandatory contract terms that require insurers
to timely investigate and settle claims, to notify insured employees of the benefits and coverage contained in insurance
policies that are pertinent to a claim, and to refrain from attempts to obtain fraudulent releases of claims from their insured's.'3 2
While the precedential value of the Pilot Life opinion regarding the integral policy relationship leg of the McCarranFerguson test is vague, several Supreme Court opinions specifically addressing the extent of federal preemption under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act "business of insurance" language
indicate that laws regulating insurance company claims practices and the enforcement of insurance contracts do impact an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer
and the insured. In SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,' quoted
in Metropolitan Life,' the Court described the type of practices Congress intended to reserve to the states under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.'35 The National Securities Court
found that the "business of insurance" covered practices that
focused on the "relationship between insurer and insured, the
type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, and enforcement."'36 Likewise, in United States Department of the
129. Id. at 375.
130. Id. at 374.
131. See Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir.
2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (June 29, 2001). See 2 LEE. R. Russ &
THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 19:1, at 19-2 to 19-4 (3d ed. 1995)
("Existing and valid statutory provisions enter into and form a part of all contracts of insurance to which they are applicable.").
132. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 1250.5 (1)-(4), (8)-(9) (1999).
133. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
134. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743-44 (1985).
135. Nat'l Sec., 393 U.S. at 457.
136. See id. at 460 (emphasis added). The Court explained,
Congress was concerned [in the McCarran-Ferguson Act] with the type
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Treasury v. Fabe,"7 the Supreme Court held that an Ohio law
regulating the actual performance of an insurance contract in
a bankruptcy setting was central to the policy relationship
between the insurer and the insured because the law impacted the payment of policyholder claims.'3 8 Additionally, in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court specifically described laws regulating claims
practices as laws that regulate the transacting of the business
of insurance.'39
Anschultz and its genre have extended the preemption
rationale of Pilot Life beyond the plain meaning of the savings clause.'40 It defies common sense, and plain meaning, to
suggest that laws like Florida's unfair insurance practices
statute do not impact an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured. In a savings clause
case involving California's common law rule that an insurer
must show actual prejudice before denying a late-filed claim,
of state regulation that centers around the contract of insurance...
The relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which
could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement-these
were the core of the "business of insurance." Undoubtedly, other activities of insurance companies relate so closely to their status as reliable
insurers that they too must be placed in the same class. But whatever
the exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear where the focus was-it
was on the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder. Statutes aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship,
directly or indirectly, are laws regulating the "business of insurance."
Id.
137. 508 U.S. 491, 503 (1993) ("There can be no doubt that the actual performance of an insurance contract falls within the 'business of insurance,' as we
understood that phrase in Pireno and Royal Drug. To hold otherwise would be
mere formalism.").
138. Id. at 503-04 ("The Ohio priority statute is designed to carry out the enforcement of insurance contracts by ensuring the payment of policyholder's
claims despite the insurance company's intervening bankruptcy."). See also
Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Group Life & Health
Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
139. See Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 728 & n.2 ("Laws regulating aspects of
transacting the business of group insurance include, for example, those regulating claims practices or rates."). See also UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526
U.S. 358, 375 n.5 (1999) ("We reject UNUM's suggestion that because the notice-prejudice rule regulates only the administration of insurance policies, not
their substantive terms, it cannot be an integral part of the policy relationship.").
140. See DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 920 F.2d
457 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Life Ins. Co. of N.A., 857 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1988);
Ramirez v. Inter-Cont'l Hotels, 890 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1989).
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the Ninth Circuit wondered, "If California's rule does not
' Similarly, if the
regulate insurance, what does it regulate?" 41
claims settlement process is not integral to the insuredinsurer policy relationship, what is? Considering Supreme
Court precedents that view laws regulating the enforcement
of insurance contracts and the claims settlement process as
falling within the term "business of insurance," and considering the Court's shift away from unfettered ERISA preemption since Travelers, 4' the continued reliance on inconsistent
language in the Pilot Life opinion to suggest that state bad
faith and unfair insurance practices laws do not impact an integral part of the insured-insurer policy relationship is not
persuasive."
Anschultz is not an unprincipled opinion. The Eleventh
Circuit decision followed directly on the heels of Pilot Life and
typifies circuit court bad faith cases that appear to have been
influenced by a perception garnered from the early Supreme
Court preemption opinions that Congress intended ERISA to
provide national uniformity in welfare plan regulation. The
Fourth Circuit's treatment of the insurance bad faith issue
following Fabe, however, demonstrates how some courts have
strained to limit ERISA plan participant claims without any
real foundation in the statute or in Supreme Court author141. Cisneros v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 1998).
142. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). Prior to the Travelers decision in 1995, the
Supreme Court had endorsed an extremely broad view of ERISA preemption,

and any court that limited the scope of ERISA would have been bucking a
strong trend, even if persuasive arguments supported a more narrow view of

ERISA's nullification of state law. See generally Bogan, supra note 28, at 9861011.

143. But see Bridges v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 121 F. Supp. 2d
1369, 1373 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (observing that UNUM did not diminish the Anschultz precedent because Anschultz held that Florida's unfair insurance practices statute failed two of the three McCarran-Ferguson Act factors). The Anschultz opinion briefly mentions Pilot Life's implied preemption under ERISA §

502 as additional support for its conclusion that ERISA preempted Florida's unfair insurance practices statute, but the Court did not examine § 502 in any
depth, or discuss how ERISA preemption impacts removal jurisdiction. In an-

other unfair insurance practices case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reached the same preemption conclusion as the Eleventh Circuit in Anschultz,
but the Court in Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 867 F.2d 489

(9th Cir. 1988), grounded its holding solely on ERISA's implied preemption of
state court remedies under ERISA § 502. See infra Part III for a discussion of §
502 implied preemption.

2001]

ERISA PREEMPTION

ity.14

In Tri-State Machine, Inc. v. Nationwide Life Insurance
Co. ,141 the Fourth Circuit concluded that West Virginia's Un-

fair Trade Practices Act,14 which regulates insurance companies by prohibiting certain unfair settlement practices, was
not saved from ERISA preemption solely because the statute
did not affect the spreading of policyholder risk.' 7 Nationwide Life Insurance Company ("Nationwide") insured and
administered several non-pension employee benefit plans
provided by Tri-State Machine, Inc. for its employees.'48 After
a dispute with Nationwide concerning the manner in which
the insurer carried out its claims processing responsibilities,
Tri-State Machine, Inc. sued the insurer in state court alleging breach of contract, common law bad faith, and statutory
unfair insurance practices.'49 Nationwide removed the action
to federal court and the district court thereafter dismissed
every claim as preempted by ERISA"' The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissals,"' badly twisting Supreme Court precedent in the process.
The West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices statute, contained in the insurance chapter of the West Virginia Code, recites that
[tihe purpose of this article is to regulate trade practices
in the business of insurance in accordance with the intent
of Congress as expressed in the [McCarran-Ferguson Act],
by defining, or providing for the determination of, all such
practices in this State which constitute unfair methods of
competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices and by
15 2
prohibiting the trade practices so defined or determined.
Despite the very clear attempt by the West Virginia legisla144. See Karen A. Jordan, ERISA Preemption:IntegratingFabe into the Sav-

ings Clause Analysis, 27 RUTGERs L.J. 273 (1996).
145. 33 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1994).
146. W. VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 33-11-1 to 33-11-10 (Michie 2000).

147. Tri-State Mach., 33 F.3d at 314-16.
148. Id. at 311.
149. Id.
150. Nationwide based removal on both diversity and federal question jurisdiction. Id. The Court did not discuss removal jurisdiction or complete preemption. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the complete preemption doctrine and
removal jurisdiction.
151. Tri-State Mach., 33 F.3d at 311.
152. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-11-1 (Michie 2000).
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ture to define its Unfair Trade Practices statute as a law that
regulates the business of insurance within the ambit of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ' the Fourth Circuit majority did
not ask whether the statute was directed at the insurance industry, or whether the law regulated practices integral to the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured. Instead, Judge Niemeyer wrote that the Supreme Court in MetropolitanLife Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts "concluded that
Congress intended to save from preemption only those state
laws that regulate the traditional business of insurance to the
extent that it involves contractual arrangements for protec54
tion against financial loss through the spreading of risk.""
The Supreme Court concluded no such thing in Metropolitan
Life.
In fact, the Metropolitan Life opinion expressly rejected
the argument that ERISA's savings clause exempts only "traditional" insurance laws from preemption. In Metropolitan
Life, the group insurers argued that the Massachusetts mandated benefits law was "in reality a health law that merely
operates on insurance ... and that it is not the kind of tradi-

tional insurance law intended to be saved by § 514(b)(2)(A)." 55
In response, Justice Blackmun wrote,
We find this argument unpersuasive.... [NJothing in §
514(b)(2)(A) [the savings clause] or in the "deemer clause"
which modifies it, purports to distinguish between traditional and innovative insurance laws. The presumption is
against pre-emption and we are not inclined to read limitations into federal statutes in order to enlarge their pre153. See Tri-State Mach., 33 F.3d at 314.
154. Id. at 312 ("In [Metropolitan Life] the Supreme Court construed the
Savings Clause to apply only to state laws regulating core insurance issues.").
The Act provides a long list of prohibited acts in the marketing, selling,
and administering of insurance in West Virginia. It prohibits false or
misleading statements or advertising as to the contents of a policy and
also prohibits engaging in unfair settlement practices, in an apparent
effort to provide truth in insurance advertising and fairness in insurance administration. The Act prohibits many of the practices alleged
by Tri-State in its complaint to constitute improper claims processing.
But this type of regulation is not unique to the business of insurance,
and it does not target, at least in these provisions, the core business of
insurance which involves contracts of protection under which risk is
spread among policy holders.
Id. at 314.
155. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 734, 741 (1985).
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emptive scope. Further, there is no indication in the leghistory that Congress had such a distinction in
islative
156
mind.
Further, it was in Metropolitan Life that the Court first applied the three-factor McCarran-Ferguson Act test to aid in
The
the construction of ERISA's savings clause language.'
facthree
of
the
spreading of policyholder risk is only one part
tors test, and courts only employ the three factors test to confirm 15the common-sense view of laws that regulate insurance. 8
In Tri-State Machine, Judge Niemeyer chose one of the
three factors that the Supreme Court said bear on the definition of the phrase "business of insurance," elevated that factor
above all else, including common-sense, and then tried to
sanitize his efforts by misrepresenting Supreme Court
The majority opinion in Tri-State ignores the
authority.9
crucial fact that, unlike the common law claim in Pilot Life,
West Virginia's unfair insurance practices statute does regulate insurance under a common-sense view because the statute unquestionably applies only to the insurance industry.
In dissent, Judge Luttig established that the majority
opinion's failure to discuss the common-sense test was an intentional omission, rather than an innocent oversight, when
156. Id. at 741-42. The Massachusetts Supreme Court had also expressly
rejected this argument. See Attorney Gen. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d
1223, 1228-29 (Mass. 1982); UNUM Life Ins. Co. v Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 375 n.5
(1999) ("We reject UNUM's suggestion that because the notice-prejudice rule
regulates only the administration of insurance policies, not their substantive
terms, it cannot be an integral part of the policy relationship."). See also Brief
of Amicus Curie the United States at 10, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41 (1987) (citing Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 724) ("This court squarely rejected the
argument that ERISA's saving clause was intended merely to preserve from
preemption traditional state insurance laws such as those regulating the manner in which insurance may be sold.").
157. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 742.
158. See UNUM Life, 526 U.S. at 373.
159. Judge Niemeyer also relied upon another Fourth Circuit opinion, which
he authored, to support the view that ERISA preempts West Virginia's unfair
insurance practices statute. Notably, in Custer v. Pan American Life Insurance
Co., 12 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 1993), just as in Tri-State, Judge Niemeyer wrote that
in Pilot Life the Supreme Court "concluded that a state cause of action for improper claim processing filed against an insurer is not saved from preemption"
without ever addressing the limits of the Pilot Life holding or the difference between the state law at issue in Pilot Life and the West Virginia statue. Id. at
420.
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he forcefully argued that the majority misconstrued Supreme
Court savings clause precedents. 6 ° Judge Luttig observed
that Pilot Life's savings clause holding did not extend to all
state law improper claims processing actions. 6 ' He pointed
out that the question before the Court in Pilot Life was
whether ERISA superseded a common law bad faith claim
that was not aimed specifically at the insurance industry.16 2
Properly focusing on the sole criteria identified by the Court
in Metropolitan Life and Pilot Life as establishing the common sense understanding of a law that regulates insurance,
Judge Luttig exclaimed that "if any law can be said to be 'specifically directed toward the [insurance] industry,' it is [West
Virginia's unfair insurance practices] statute." 3
The dissent in Tri-State Machine is significant because
Judge Luttig recognized Pilot Life's very narrow savings
clause application. Within a year of Tri-State Machine, the
Supreme Court changed its broad overall tone concerning the
extent of ERISA preemption when the Court decided New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co.' Though Travelers is not a savings
clause case, it is important to recognize that the Travelers
Court renounced a position that was basic to the Pilot Life
savings clause rationale.
In Travelers, the Court emphasized the statutory construction tenet that courts should not interpret federal statutes to preempt state laws in traditional areas of state governance unless the federal enactment unmistakably required
such a construction. 6 ' In Metropolitan Life, the Court relied
160. Tri-State Mach., 33 F.3d at 318 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 316-17.
163. Id. at 318. Judge Luttig also cited United States Department of the
Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993), and Securities & Exchange Commission
v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), to support his conclusion that
West Virginia's unfair insurance practices law satisfied the McCarran-Ferguson
Act test. Tri-State Mach., 33 F.3d at 318 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
164. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
165. The Court wrote,
[We have never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state
regulation, but instead have addressed claims of pre-emption with the
starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state
law. Indeed, in cases like this one, where federal law is said to bar
state action in fields of traditional state regulation, we have worked on
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
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upon this principle to reject the insurance industry's argument that ERISA's savings clause should be construed narAs previously discussed, however, Pilot Life distinrowly.'
guished Metropolitan Life and ruled that ERISA's savings
clause exception to preemption should be construed narrowly
because the structure of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme,
and the legislative history of that paragraph, indicated that
Congress intended ERISA to occupy the field of employee
benefit plan regulation.'67 The lower federal courts did not
immediately recognize that the Court's shift away from a very
broad view of ERISA preemption under the statute's preemption clause in Travelers should inform the savings clause
analysis. The Court's latest savings clause case, however,
confirms that the statutory construction rule providing for a
presumption against preemption in areas of traditional state
governance applies equally to the savings clause.
D. The Supreme Court Clarifiesthe "Savings Clause" Test
In 1999, the Court addressed some of the confusion existing in the lower courts concerning the scope of ERISA's
savings clause when it decided UNUM Life Insurance Co. v.
Ward.'69 UNUM involved an ERISA preemption challenge to
California's common law rule that an insurance company
must show actual prejudice before it can deny a late-filed
claim for benefits under a notice of claim provision in an insurance policy. 7 ° UNUM Life Insurance Company provided
insurance to fund an ERISA disability benefits plan."' A
policy provision required plan participants to submit a claim
to the insurance company within eighteen months of the
loss.'72 After the onset of Mr. Ward's illness, he applied for
state disability benefits and social security disability benefits,
apparently unaware that he was also covered through his
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.
Id. at 654-55 (internal quotation and citations omitted).
166. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 735-47 (1985).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 88-103.
168. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
169. 526 U.S. 358.
170. See Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 384 P.2d 155 (Cal. 1963) (en banc).
171. UNUM, 526 U.S. at 364.
172. Id.
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employment under the UNUM policy. 73 Within the UNUM
policy time limits, Ward informed his employer that he had
been approved for both state benefits and social security disability payments. 7 4 However, Ward did not submit a claim
directly to UNUM until he discovered he might be eligible for
benefits from UNUM when he happened upon his employee
benefits
booklet two years after the inception of his disabil175
ity.
The insurance company denied Ward's claim because he
filed it late.'76 Ward then sued UNUM in federal court to recover his plan benefits under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, relying upon California's notice-prejudice rule to
overcome the insurance company's late-filing defense.'77
UNUM asserted that ERISA expressly preempted the California notice-prejudice rule because the common law rule
"related to" an ERISA plan.'7 8 Ward argued that the noticeprejudice rule was saved from ERISA preemption because it
79
was a law that regulated insurance.
The Supreme Court confirmed that California's noticeprejudice rule regulated insurance under a common-sense
analysis because the law only applied to insurance companies.
Additionally, the Court added further specificity to
the savings clause formula by ruling that a state law need not
satisfy all three factors of the McCarran-Ferguson Act test in
order to be exempt from preemption under the savings
clause.'
The UNUM Court held that the McCarran173. Ward. v. Mgmt. Analysis Co. Employee Disability Benefit Plan, 135 F.3d
1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1998).
174. Id.
175. See id. Ward's employer also failed to submit a disability claim within
the policy time period. Id.
176. UNUM, 526 U.S. at 365.
177. Id. at 363.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 364.
180. The Ninth Circuit held that the savings clause exempted the California
notice-prejudice rule from ERISA preemption. Ward v. Mgmt. Analysis Co., 135
F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 1998). Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
under California agency law, notice to Ward's employer constituted notice to
UNUM. Id. at 1289. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's
alternate holding that California's agency law did not relate to ERISA. The Supreme Court, without analysis, held that California's agency law did indeed relate to ERISA and was therefore preempted. See UNUM, 526 U.S. at 377-79.
181. UNUM, 526 U.S. at 373 ("Preliminarily, we reject UNUM's assertion
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18 2
Ferguson Act factors are merely "guideposts" to help inform
the common-sense determination of whether a state law fits
83
within the savings clause exception to ERISA preemption.'
Prior to UNUM, several circuit courts adopted a construction of the savings clause which directed that both the
common-sense test and each of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
factors must be satisfied for a state law to avoid ERISA pre5
UNUM expressly rejected that view,'8 but it reemption.'
mains somewhat uncertain what portion, or portions, of the
common sense and three factors criteria must be met for a
8 6 An accountant's
state law to survive ERISA preemption.'
view of the savings clause following UNUM might hold that a
state law must be aimed specifically at the insurance industry, plus affect either policyholder risk or some integral part
of the insurer-insured relationship to satisfy current doctrine.
Rather than merely counting factors, however, UNUM sug-

that a state regulation must satisfy all three McCarran-Ferguson factors to
'regulate insurance' under ERISA's savings clause.").
182. Id. (quoting Cisneros v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir.
1998)) (observing that the Metropolitan Life Court first determined that the
state law at issue fit a common-sense understanding of insurance regulation,
then "checked its conclusion against the criteria from case law interpreting the
phrase 'business of insurance' under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.").
183. The Court cited both of its previous savings clause cases for support of
its statement that the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors are not required elements that must all be proved before a law can be said to "regulate insurance"
under ERISA's savings clause. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 734, 743 (1985) (McCarran-Ferguson Act factors are relevant); Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 49 (1987) (considerations to be weighed). See
also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) ("[Nlone of the
[McCarran-Ferguson three factor] criteria is necessarily determinative in itself"). Additionally, the UNUM Court quoted the District of Columbia Circuit
Court with approval when that court stated "[t]hat the [McCarran-Ferguson]
factors are merely 'relevant' suggests that they need not all point in the same
direction, or else they would be 'required."' UNUM, 526 U.S. at 373 (quoting
O'Connor v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 146 F.3d 959, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See
also Franklin H. Williams Ins. Trust v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 144, 150 (2nd
Cir. 1995) ("In our view,... MetropolitanLife placed its primary emphasis upon
a 'common sense' assessment of the state statute at issue in that case, and simply supplemented that assessment with a discussion of the statute's conformance with the McCarran-Ferguson standards.").
184. See CIGNA Healthplan of La. v. State of Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642, 650
(5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 964 (1996); Tingle v. Pac. Mut. Ins. Co.,
996 F.2d 105, 108-10 & n.25 (5th Cir. 1993); DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 920 F.2d 457, 468-70 (7th Cir. 1990).
185. UNUM, 526 U.S. at 373.
186. See generally Jordan, supra note 144.
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gests that courts should adhere to a more fluid approach in
weighing whether a state law "regulates insurance" under
ERISA's savings clause.'
Coupling the Travelers message
with UNUM's holding, it becomes clear that, at a minimum,
courts must emphasize the presumption against preemption
in any ERISA non-pension employee benefits claim, including
a claim involving the savings clause.
E. The Return of Bad FaithRemedies: An Emerging Trend
Following UNUM
Following UNUM Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, numerous
plan participants urged federal district courts to re-examine
their ERISA preemption precedents and to allow state bad
faith and unfair insurance practices claims to proceed under
UNUM's clarified savings clause authority.' While the district courts remain divided, several courts have now held,
contrary to pre-UNUM circuit court authority, that state law
bad faith remedies laws that specifically target the insurance
industry do regulate insurance within the ambit of ERISA's
savings clause."' 8
187. See UNUM, 526 U.S. at 373 (describing the Court's savings clause
precedents as "supple"). Perhaps the message is that a state law will be saved
from preemption if it specifically targets the insurance industry, and affects
policyholder risk or an integral part of the insurer-insured policy relationship,
where the court's interpretation of those factors will be broadly construed in favor of finding that a law does regulate insurance.
188. See, e.g., Lewis v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (N.D.
Okla. 1999).
189. Compare Colligan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 00-K-2512, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8103 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2001) (order denying motion to dismiss); Salter v. United Health Care of Ala., Inc., No. CV01-BU-0800-S Doc. 2.
(N.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2001) (order granting in part and denying in part motion to
dismiss); Hill v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (N.D. Ala.
2000), overruled by Gilbert v. ALTA Health & Life Ins. Co., No. 01-10829, 2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 27200 (11th Cir. Dec. 27, 2001); Selby v. Principal Mut. Life
Ins. Co., No. 98-Civ. 5283 (RLC), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1495 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
2000); Lewis v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (N.D. Okla.
1999); Norman v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., No. C99-5463 JKA, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21478 (W.D. Wash. May 12, 2000) (motion for summary judgment
granted in part and denied in part); Hall v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., No. 97-M-1828
(D. Colo. Nov. 1, 1999) (Matsch, J.) (order granting motion for leave to file
amended complaint); with Jabour v. Cigna Healthcare of Cal., Inc., 162 F. Supp.
2d 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2001); English v. Capital Risk Mgmt. Inc., No. 01-D-659-S,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11989 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2001); Hamilton v. United
HealthCare of La., Inc., No. 01-585 c/w 01-650 Sec. "J" (4), 2001 U. S. Dist.
LEXIS 6791 (E.D. La. May 16, 2001); Cencula v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., No.
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Judge Sven Erik Holmes in the Northern District of
Oklahoma decided the first case to uphold a state law bad
In Lewis v. Aetna U.S.
faith claim following UNUM.
Healthcare, Inc.,' a plan insurer removed a state common
law bad faith claim arising from an employment-provided life
9
insurance policy to Judge Holmes' federal district court. '
Along with removal, Aetna moved to dismiss the state law
9
The
claims based upon ERISA's express preemption clause.
from
saved
was
claim
faith
plaintiff asserted that her bad
preemption, arguing that UNUM changed the savings clause
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had
legal landscape.9
ERISA preempted an Oklahoma state
that
ruled
previously
law bad faith claim arising from the alleged violation of
Judge
Oklahoma's unfair insurance practices statute.'
Holmes found that UNUM had effectively overruled this
authority, and he re-examined plaintiffs claims under
9
UNUM's more generous savings clause formula. '
Judge Holmes exhaustively reviewed Oklahoma state
court precedent and discovered that Oklahoma only applies
its bad faith breach of contract remedy against the insurance
industry.9 The Oklahoma Supreme Court first recognized a
common law claim for bad faith breach of an insurance con98-C-0562, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5519 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2001); Coffman v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 138 F. Supp. 2d 764 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 25, 2001); Bridges v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Love
v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 997 (M.D. Ala. 2000); Zimnoch v. ITT
Hartford, No. 99-6594, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2846 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2000);
Clancy v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 101 F. Supp. 2d 463 (E.D. La. 2000); Tutolo v. Independence Blue Cross, No. 98-CV-5928, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6335
(E.D. Pa. May 5, 1999).
190. 78 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (N.D. Okla. 1999).
191. Id. at 1203.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1212.
194. See Gaylor v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 112 F. 3d 460 (10th Cir. 1997)
(relying on Pilot Life, holding that the Oklahoma's state law claim is not saved
from ERISA preemption, and is also impliedly preempted by ERISA § 502).
195. Lewis, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1214 n.9.
196. In Gaylor, the Tenth Circuit likened Oklahoma's bad faith law to the
Mississippi law at issue in Pilot Life, and found that Oklahoma's bad faith law
was not aimed solely at the insurance industry; however, the Gaylor Court did
not analyze Oklahoma's bad faith law in any depth. See Gaylor, 112 F.3d at 466
("[Allthough Oklahoma's bad faith law is specifically directed at the insurance
industry, we note that, like the bad faith law in Pilot Life, its origins are from
general principles of tort and contract law.").
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tract in Christian v. American Home Assurance Co.'97 Quoting from one of the two seminal California cases that first articulated the policies behind the tort, the Christian court
stressed that a claim for violation of an insurer's breach of its
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises out of
the unique relationship between the insured and the insurer:
[Tihe special relationship and duties of the insurer exist in
recognition of the fact that the insured does not contract
"... to obtain a commercial advantage but to protect

[himself] against the risks of accidental losses, including
the mental distress which might follow from the losses.
Among the considerations in purchasing.., insurance, as
insurers are well aware, is the peace of mind and security
it will provide in the event of an accidental loss.. .,,198
Given the important insurance law policy considerations supporting Oklahoma's bad faith remedy, which clearly distinguished Oklahoma's law from the Mississippi law described
in Pilot Life, and given UNUM's broader construction of the
savings clause, Judge Holmes found that Oklahoma's bad
faith claim was saved from ERISA preemption.
Similarly, in Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama,'99 a federal district court found that a state law bad
faith insurance claim arising from an ERISA welfare benefit
plan was saved from preemption following UNUM, despite
circuit court authority to the contrary."' The Eleventh Circuit had previously held that ERISA preempted state law bad
faith claims under Alabama law.20 ' In Amos v. Blue CrossBlue Shield of Alabama,2 ' an Eleventh Circuit panel had ex197. 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978).
198. Lewis, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1206-07 (quoting Christian, 577 P.2d at 902)
(quoting Fletcher v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 480 (Cal. Ct. App.
1970). See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). See also
ASHLEY, supra note 107, §§ 2:01-2:15, 11:01-11:07.
199. 117 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (overruled by Gilbeert v. ATLA
Health & Life Ins. Co., No. 01-10829, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27200 (11th Cir.
Dec. 27, 2001).
200. Id. at 1210.
201. Amos v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Ala., 868 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1989).
The Amos Court, relying on MetropolitanLife Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S.
58 (1987), also held that when such claims were filed in state court, the claims
could be removed to federal court under the complete preemption doctrine.
Amos, 868 F.2d at 431. See implied preemption discussion infra Part III, and
complete preemption discussion infra Part IV.
202. 868 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1989).
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pressed its regret that ERISA preemption law was producing
the "unintended consequence of removing historical disincentives to insurance company misbehavior," but held that "any
have to be charted by the Conchange in the law's course will
20 3
gress or the Supreme Court."
In Hill, District Judge William M. Acker, Jr. determined
that UNUM had, in fact, charted a new course in the imple4
mentation of ERISA's savings clause." Judge Acker took his
guidance from the Supreme Court's remark in UNUM, which
unequivocally stated that ERISA preempted the Mississippi
bad faith law at issue in Pilot Life specifically because the
Mississippi law was not limited in its application to claims
against the insurance industry.0 5
In Colligan v. UNUM Life Insurance Co.,2 6 District Judge
John Kane considered an ERISA preemption challenge to a
Colorado bad faith claim brought by an ERISA plan participant against a plan insurer.0 7 As in Lewis, Judge Kane examined the policy reasons underlying the state bad faith law
and found that, in Colorado, the remedy grew out of considerations peculiar to the relationship between an insurer and
an insured.0 8 In Decker v. Browning-Ferris Industries of
Colorado, Inc., ° the Colorado Supreme Court declined to rec203. Id. at 433.
204. Hill, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1211.
205. Id. ("[Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux] concerned Mississippi common law
creating a cause of action for bad faith breach of contract, [a] law not specifically
directed to the insurance industry and therefore not saved from ERISA preemption.") (quoting UNUM, 526 U.S. at 377 n.7) (citations omitted). The federal
district courts in Alabama have been particularly active in addressing the issue
of whether ERISA preempts Alabama's state law bad faith claim, with the
Northern District of Alabama finding the claim saved from preemption and the
Middle District upholding preemption. Compare Salter v. United Health Care
of Ala., Inc., No. CV01-BU-0800-S Doc. 2. (N.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2001), and Hill v.
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (N.D. Ala. 2000), overruled
by Gilbert v. ALTA Health & Life Ins. Co., No. 01-10829, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
27200 (l1th Cir. Dec. 27, 2001), with English v. Capital Risk Mgmt., Inc., No.
01-D-659-S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11989 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2001), Hooper v.
Albany Int'l Corp., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Ala. 2001), and Love v. Fortis
Benefits Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 997 (M.D. Ala. 2000). See also Salva v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., No. 01-0329-S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12522
(S.D. Ala. June 18, 2001).
206. No. 00-K-2512, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8103 (D. Colo.Apr. 23, 2001).
207. Id. at *5.
208. Id. at *8.
209. 931 P.2d 436 (Colo. 1997).
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ognize the existence of a tort claim for violation of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing in the context of an employment
contract. 20 The Decker court analyzed the tort of bad faith
breach of contract and found that the policy reasons underlying the tort were unique to the insurance industry.2 1' The
Colorado Supreme Court held that
[a]n insurer's tort liability for breach of an implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing arises from the nature of the
insurance contract as well as from the relationship between the insurer and the insured. In contrast to a party
who seeks to secure commercial advantage in the context
of a general commercial contract, an insured who enters
into a contract of insurance seeks to obtain "financial security and protection against calamity." Because an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay valid claims defeats the
very purpose of the insurance contract, a special duty is
imposed upon an insurer to deal in good faith with an insured.212
The federal district courts that have allowed state law
bad faith claims to proceed in spite of ERISA preemption
challenges have easily distinguished Pilot Life's savings
clause approach.2 13 Circuit courts, like the Eleventh Circuit in
Anschultz, could have reached the same conclusion these district judges are reaching now, but the tenor of Supreme Court
ERISA preemption jurisprudence prior to Travelers counseled
against any narrowing of ERISA preemption. 24 Neither
Travelers nor UNUM expressly overrule Pilot Life, but those
210. Id. at 440.
211. Id. at 446.
212. The Colorado Supreme Court continued,
This "quasi-fiduciary" relationship between an insurer and an insured
is thus based in part on this special contract. In addition, when an insured suffers a loss, the insured becomes "particularly vulnerable" to
the insurer. For example, an insurer may delay payment of a claim to
the insured in the hope of settling for an amount less than what might
be due under the contract. Thus the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in the context of [an] insurance contract[] also arises from
the heightened reliance necessarily placed by an insured on the insurer.
Colligan, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8103, at *4 (quoting Decker, 931 P.2d at 443)
(citations omitted).
213. See, e.g., Lewis v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (N.D.
Okla. 1999).
214. See generally Bogan, supra note 28.

20011

ERISA PREEMPTION

149

two cases, with their marked change in tone favoring a more
limited application of ERISA preemption, have now freed
lower courts to carefully scrutinize arguments urging the
nullification of state law in areas of traditional state dominance. As a result, bad faith laws are making a comeback in
claims against ERISA plan insurers, but the story is not over
yet.
Each of the published federal district court opinions that
have allowed state law bad faith or unfair insurance practices
cases to proceed following UNUM have focused solely on the
savings clause exemption from preemption for state laws that
regulate insurance.215 As previously discussed, however, Pilot
Life suggests that, in addition to ERISA's express preemption
of state law, Congress intended ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions to provide the exclusive vehicle for plan partici21
pants to pursue a claim for benefits under an ERISA plan.
While the district court opinions that distinguish Pilot Life's
savings clause application are sound, courts evaluating
ERISA's possible preemption of state bad faith claims should
also address Pilot Life's alternate implied preemption rationale.
III. THE SAVINGS CLAUSE AND § 502: A CONFLICT BETWEEN
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED PREEMPTION
A.

The Kanne Approach

UNUM Life Insurance Co. v. Ward. 7 clarified the express
preemption analysis, previously addressed in Metropolitan
218 and Pilot Life Insurance
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts
Co. v Dedeaux,"9 which courts must apply when considering
whether a state law is exempt from ERISA preemption under
the savings clause. As a result of UNUM, we know that the
215. See, e.g., Gilbert v. ALTA Health & Life Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1267
(N.D. Ala. 2000), rev'd, No. 01-10829, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27200 (11th Cir.
Dec. 27, 2001); Hill v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1209
(N.D. Ala. 2000), overruled by Gilbert v. ALTA Health & Life Ins. Co., No. 0110829 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27200 (11th Cir. Dec. 27, 2001); Lewis, 78 F. Supp.
2d 1202.
216. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52.
217. 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
218. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
219. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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McCarran-Ferguson Act factors identified by the Supreme
Court as affecting the savings clause inquiry are checkpoints,
but not required elements, for courts to weigh in support of
the commonsense observation that a challenged state law
regulates insurance."' UNUM, however, did not directly address the § 502 implied preemption thesis advanced in the Pilot Life opinion as a second reason justifying the Court's nullification of the plaintiffs state law bad faith cause of action in
that case.
Recall that in Pilot Life the Court inferred from the legislative history and structure of ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions that Congress intended § 502 to supplant all state
law remedies in connection with a claim for benefits under an
ERISA plan.'
UNUM did not examine the interplay of
ERISA's express exemption from preemption under the savings clause and preemption implied under ERISA § 502 because the state law at issue in UNUM, the California noticeprejudice rule, was not a remedies law.222 Similarly, in Pilot
Life the Court did not have to balance its implied preemption
formula under § 502 against the circumstance of a direct conflict with the limiting language in ERISA's express savings
clause because the Mississippi common law remedy at issue
in Pilot Life was not a law that regulated insurance. 2 3 Alter
the Pilot Life facts, however, and imagine that an ERISA plan
participant sues a plan insurer under state law seeking punitive damages for tortious breach of an insurance contract
(common law bad faith or statutory unfair insurance practices) in a state where that remedy only applies to claims
against the insurance industry. 24' Is the state law bad faith
or unfair insurance practices remedy impliedly preempted by
§ 502, even though the remedies law would otherwise be ex220. UNUM, 526 U.S. at 373.
221. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 51-57.
222. See UNUM, 526 U.S. 376-77 ("UNUM next contends that ERISA's civil
enforcement provision, § 502 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a), preempts any action for
plan benefits brought under state rules such as notice-prejudice. Whatever the
merits of UNUM's view of § 502 (a)'s preemptive force, the issue is not implicated here. Ward sued under § 502 (a) 'to recover benefits due ... under the
terms of his plan."').
223. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 49.
224. See, e.g., Lewis v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (N.D.
Okla. 1999) (holding that Oklahoma's bad faith remedy applied only against insurers, and therefore, was saved from ERISA's § 514 preemption).
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pressly saved from preemption under UNUM's expanded
savings clause formula? While this question remains unanswered in the Supreme Court, several circuit courts have decided the issue. Unfortunately, the cases that present the
fact scenario which invites an exploration of the interplay between the savings clause express exemption from preemption
and § 502 implied preemption do not fully plumb the depth of
the issue.
In Kanne v. Connecticut Life Insurance Co.,25 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this fact pattern. Kanne
involved a plan participant's complaint of mistreatment by an
ERISA health care benefits plan insurer.2 26 The Kannes filed
their state law petition under California law in effect at the
time which provided that in egregious circumstances, a consumer could recover extra-contractual damages from an insurer under either a common law bad faith theory or via an
implied right of action to enforce California's unfair insurance
practices statute.227 At trial, which occurred prior to the announcement of the Supreme Court's opinion in Pilot Life, a
jury awarded the Kannes both compensatory and punitive
damages on their state law claims.228
On appeal, then subsequent to Pilot Life, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment.22 9 In the court of appeals, the
Kannes argued that Pilot Life should be limited to its facts.2 °
They maintained that only state laws that do not regulate insurance, like the Mississippi common law claim in Pilot Life,
are preempted by ERISA, and that state laws that apply
solely to the insurance industry, like the California statutory
claim, are saved from preemption as laws that regulate insurance. Despite the Kannes' urgings, the Ninth Circuit did
not address the savings clause argument.22 ' Rather, the court
225. 867 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988).
226. Id. at 491.
227. See CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h). The California Supreme Court has
since held that the unfair insurance practices statute does not provide a private
right of action. See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal.
1988) (overruling Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979)).
228. Kanne, 867 F.2d at 491.
229. Id. at 494.
230. Id.
231. The Ninth Circuit stated,
The Kannes' argument asks us to limit Pilot Life's pre-emption holding
to only those state laws which do not fall within the savings clause. To

152

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

concluded that, even assuming the unfair insurance practices
statute did regulate insurance, ERISA preempted both the
bad faith and the unfair insurance practices claims under the
Pilot Life § 502 implied preemption authority.11
The Kanne opinion is notable for its one glaring omission.
The Ninth Circuit failed to address the fact that state law bad
faith and unfair insurance practices claims that apply exclusively to the insurance industry raise an express preemption
issue not present in Pilot Life. When a remedies law fits
within the savings clause, § 502 implied preemption conflicts
with ERISA's express exemption for laws that regulate insurance. In Kanne, the Ninth Circuit held that implied preemption arising from ERISA § 502 trumps ERISA's express savings clause exception to preemption, without ever discussing,
or seemingly even recognizing, that a clash existed. 3
accept this argument, however, we would have to ignore the second half
of Pilot Life in which the Court made abundantly clear that its preemption holding was equally based on its acceptance of the Solicitor General's view that "Congress clearly expressed an intent that the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a) be the exclusive vehicle for
actions by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits."
Id.
232. Id. at 493 ("We can assume, without deciding, that § 790.03 (h) [the
California unfair insurance practices statute] is a law regulating insurance under the savings clause. Nevertheless, under Pilot Life we find the conclusion
inescapable that the private right of action for violation of § 790.03 (h) is preempted by ERISA."). The court continued,
In sum, the detailed provisions of § 502 (a) set forth a comprehensive
civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the
need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the
public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans.
The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the
exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress had rejected in ERISA.
Id. at 494 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54).
233. See Kanne, 867 F.2d at 494 ("We do not find it possible to read [Pilot
Life's § 502 implied preemption] language in a way that permits a state statute
like [California's unfair insurance practices statute] to supplement the ERISA
civil enforcement provisions available to remedy improper claims processing.").
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Pilot Life to hold that
ERISA preempted a plaintiffs state law unfair insurance practices claim
against an ERISA disability plan insurer because ERISA impliedly preempted
state law remedies. In In Re Life Insurance Co. of North America, 857 F.2d
1190 (8th Cir. 1988), the court did not decide whether the Missouri statute at
issue regulated insurance within the context of the savings clause. Rather, the
Eighth Circuit focused solely upon the implied preemption analysis presented in
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Express Versus Implied Preemption:A Statutory
ConstructionProblem

Notice the different conflict presented in Kanne from the
conflict the Supreme Court identified in Pilot Life. The Pilot
Life Court found that Mississippi's state law bad faith remedy
conflicted with ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.23 4 With
presented a
no savings clause involvement, Pilot Life
straightforward Supremacy Clause issue; resolution of that
issue was relatively easy-federal law preempts state laws
that frustrate the purposes of the federal enactment. 235 The
conflict presented in Kanne is different. Though the Ninth
Circuit did not discuss it, the clash in Kanne is not really between a state law and a federal law; rather the Kanne facts
present a conflict between two competing sections of the same
federal statute. Framed in this manner, the issue is not so
much a preemption problem as it is a statutory construction
dilemma.
Where there are internal inconsistencies within a statute, that is, where the reasonable interpretation of one section of a statute conflicts with the reasonable interpretation
of another section of the same statute, which interpretation
controls? Classic statutory construction principles giving effect to legislative intent provide guidance.23 6 In this ERISA
statutory construction problem, we confront an express, unPilot Life arising from ERISA's civil enforcement provisions to declare that
ERISA superseded the state insurance remedies law. Id. at 1193. Because the
Eighth Circuit did not determine whether Missouri's vexatious refusal to pay
statute regulates insurance under ERISA's savings clause, the Court did not
confront the statutory construction problem, lurking-in many of these state law
unfair insurance practices and bad faith cases, of whether ERISA's implied preemption of state law remedies overrides ERISA's express exception to preemption for state laws, including insurance remedies laws, that regulate insurance.
See also Ramirez v. Inter-Cont'l Hotels, 890 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that ERISA preempts state statutes that provide a private right of action for the
improper handling of insurance claims). Cf Franklin H. Williams Ins. Trust v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1995).
234. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57.
235. The issue really is not as simple as the Pilot Life Court made out. Arguably, state law remedies that advance ERISA's consumer protection purposes
merely supplement ERISA's remedies rather than frustrate Congress's intentions. See Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999); Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
236. See generally NORMAN
CONSTRUCTION (6th ed. 2000).

J.

SINGER,
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qualified statement in the statute that laws regulating insurance shall not be preempted. Confirming this seemingly unambiguous declaration, a review of ERISA's legislative history provides no direct ammunition to suggest that state
insurance remedies laws were not intended to be included in
the savings clause exception to ERISA preemption."'
In potential conflict with ERISA's express savings clause
is the inference drawn from ERISA's civil enforcement provisions that Congress intended § 502 to provide the exclusive
remedies for identified ERISA affiliates in connection with
any employee benefit plan. The legislative history concerning
§ 502, however, is somewhat ambiguous. Senator Harrison
Williams, one of ERISA's sponsors, remarked that "with the
narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and
enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus
eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and
local regulation of employee benefit plans."238 On the one
hand, Senator Williams suggests that ERISA occupies the
field of employee benefit plan enforcement, but he justifies
this broad intent by referring to problems that can be remedied by less intrusive conflict preemption principles.2 39 Importantly, Senator Williams qualified his remarks by excluding
state laws expressly exempt from ERISA preemption when he
began by acknowledging the "narrow exceptions" in the bill.24 °
The most prominent of the "narrow exceptions," of course, is
the savings clause exception to ERISA preemption for state
laws that regulate insurance. 241
237. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 745-46 (1985).
238. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 4745-46.
239. See Bogan, supra note 28, at 979-82.
240. See 120 CONG. REc. 29,933, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 4745-46.
241. Additionally, another ERISA sponsor, in fact "the Father of ERISA,"
Senator Jacob Javits, is widely cited for his remarks that Congress intended the
federal courts to develop an ERISA common law to help implement the purposes
of the statute. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974),
reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4770-71 (statement of
Sen. Javits) ("It is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be
developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans."). See also Michael S. Gordon, ERISA,
ESOP's, and Senator Javits: The Mind of a Reformer, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 3
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Where separate sections of the same statute appear to
conflict, courts should attempt to apply a construction of the
conflicting language that harmonizes the purposes of each
section.242 Presented with the sometimes conflicting purposes
of the savings clause and § 502, a suggested solution is for
courts to identify one boundary of the field occupied by
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions by the limitation in the
savings clause. That is, § 502 provides the exclusive remedies
for all claims within the ambit of that section, except state
law remedies applicable solely against the insurance industry, which are saved from preemption by ERISA § 514. Of
course, if two sections of the same statute conflict irreconcilably, where one expressly states Congress's intent and the
other suggests a purpose merely by inference, the express
provision should control.243
C.

The Solicitor General Qualifies His § 502 Implied
Preemption Argument

While it is difficult to find any circuit court authority that
thoroughly addresses the savings clause versus § 502 conflict
in bad faith cases,244 the Supreme Court has clearly identified
the issue. In UNUM, the Court recognized, but left open the
question of whether ERISA's express exemption from preemption under the savings clause trumps implied preemption
under ERISA § 502.245 At footnote seven, the UNUM Court
explained,
We discussed [the issue of ERISA implied preemption under § 502] in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux. That case concerned Mississippi common law creating a cause of action
for bad faith breach of contract, [a] law not specifically directed to the insurance industry and therefore not saved
(1988). The suggested addition of common law remedies belies the argument
that Congress intended ERISA's § 502 remedies to be exclusive.
242. See SINGER, supra note 236, § 46.05.
243. Id. ("Where there is inescapable conflict between general and specific
terms or provisions of a statute, the specific will prevail.").
244. See, e.g., Franklin H. Williams Ins. Trust v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 F.3d
144 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that state law that is saved from preemption
cannot provide basis for removal jurisdiction); Kanne v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 867 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding, without significant discussion, that
state law insurance remedy that would otherwise be saved from preemption is
impliedly preempted by ERISA § 502).
245. UNUM, 526 U.S. at 377 n.7.
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from ERISA preemption. In that context, the Solicitor
General, for the United States as amicus curie, urged the
exclusivity of § 502 (a), ERISA's civil enforcement provision, and observed that § 502 (a) was modeled on the exclusive remedy provided by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The Court agreed with the Solicitor
General's submission.
In the instant case, the Solicitor General, for the United
States as amicus curie, has endeavored to qualify the argument advanced in Pilot Life. Noting that "LMRA Section 301 does not contain any statutory exception analogous to ERISA's insurance savings provision," the Solicitor
General now maintains that the discussion of § 502 (a) in
Pilot Life "does not in itself require that a state law that
'regulates insurance,' and so comes within the terms of the
savings clause, is nevertheless preempted if it provides a
state-law cause of action or remedy." We need not address
the Solicitor General's current argument, for Ward has
sued under § 502(a)(1)(B) for benefits due, and seeks only
the application of saved state insurance law as a relevant
rule of decision in his § 502 (a) action. 246
The Solicitor General's arguments in UNUM are persuasive, though the Supreme Court correctly held that the debate
concerning the interplay between ERISA's savings clause and
§ 502 was not presented in UNUM.2 4' The Solicitor General
observed that the implied preemption portion of the Pilot Life
opinion "is in significant tension with the text of the insurance savings provision and was unnecessary to Pilot Life's
holding" that Mississippi's bad faith law did not regulate insurance.24' The Solicitor General did not question the implied
preemption reasoning in Pilot Life, but merely suggested that
Pilot Life should not be extended to a context, not applicable
in Pilot Life, where the general exclusivity of ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions conflicts with ERISA's savings
246. Id. (citations omitted).
247. The Solicitor General disagreed with the insurance company's sugges-

tion that California's notice-prejudice rule effectively provided a state law remedy. Therefore, the Solicitor General himself suggested to the Court that the
savings clause versus § 502 conflict should not be reached in UNUM. However,
because the insurance company presented the argument, the Solicitor General
also addressed the issue. See Solicitor General's Brief at 18-21, UNUM Life Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999)(No. 97-1868).

248. Solicitor General's Brief at 20.
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clause.249 In that circumstance, said the Solicitor General,
"Congress has saved state substantive law, and it is not clear
why Congress would have wanted to foreclose all access to
state-created remedies or sanctions to enforce that substanunder
tive law, especially where the causes of action provided
25 9
Section 502 itself are not suited to that purpose."

The Solicitor General made several other cogent points in
support of the view that § 502 should not be read to preempt
state law remedies that would otherwise be exempt from preemption under the savings clause.25' Section 514(b) itself
states, "nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to ex-

249. Id.
250. The Solicitor General wrote,
To the extent ERISA preempts the field for federal regulation, it follows that both state substantive law and the measures to enforce that
state law are preempted. But where ERISA does not preempt the
field-here, because the insurance 'exception' in Section 514 (b) applies-there is force to the corresponding proposition that both state
substantive insurance law and at least some enforcement measures
necessary to make the substantive law effective are saved.
Id. at 23 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the Solicitor General continued,
In a brief filed in response to the Court's invitation at the petition stage
in Pilot Life, we argued "that since Congress intended the procedures it
established in Section 502 to be the exclusive procedures for enforcing
claims for benefits due under employee benefit plans, the states are
barred from establishing alternative procedures." We adhere to that
conclusion in circumstances like those that were before the Court in Pilot Life, where a beneficiary invoked a general 'state common law cause
of action' to obtain benefits under a plan, as well as other remedies.
For the reasons given in the text, however, the exclusive nature of Section 502 may come into conflict with, rather than reinforce, the terms of
the insurance savings clause where the participant or beneficiary (like
the State Attorney General in Metropolitan Life) invokes a cause of action under state law that "regulates insurance"-e.g., to enforce a specific provision of state insurance law that could not be enforced in a suit
under Section 502. Insofar as our discussion in the text departs from
the views we expressed at the certiorari stage in Pilot Life, it is worth
noting that our submissions concerning ERISA preemption-like the
Courts analyses-have been refined in light of the benefit of siguificant
experience with ERISA preemption in the intervening 12 years. Specifically, it is now clear that preemption analysis must begin with the
presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt state law, particularly in "fields of traditional state regulation." That presumption is
particularly strong in the area of state insurance regulation, whose
continued validity and application to ERISA plans Congress expressly
provided for.
Id. at 25 n.14.
251. Id. at 22-23.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

empt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance."2 5 ' "This subchapter" includes § 502,
"[a]ccordingly, the savings clause, by its terms directs that
nothing in Section 502 ... shall be 'construed' to relieve or
exempt any person from 'any law' of a State that regulates insurance."2 53 Additionally, to the extent that the Pilot Life
Court relied on Congress' intent that § 502 was to emulate
the broad preemptive effect given to § 301 of the LMRA, that
analogy must be tempered with the realization that the
LMRA does not contain a savings provision.
While Section 301 is no doubt highly instructive in cases
in which the scope of ERISA's broad "relates to" preemption provision is at issue, Congress's enactment of the insurance savings provision suggests that it did not intend
that parallel [to § 301 of the LMRA] to be controlling
where the state law, while within the scope of the preemption provision, also falls within the terms of the insurance
savings clause. 254
Finally, in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Con255
struction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California,
the first Supreme Court opinion to discuss the interplay of §
502 and ERISA's savings clause, the Court found that ERISA
§ 502 "does not purport to reach every question relating to
plans covered by ERISA."'5 6 Contrasting § 502 with LMRA §
301, the Franchise Tax Board Court observed that § 301 of
the LMRA applies to all suits for violation of collectively bargained contracts, whereas ERISA's savings clause "makes
clear that Congress did not intend to preempt entirely every
state cause of action relating to [ERISA employee benefit
252. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A).
253. See Solicitor General's Brief at 23 ("ITIhe insurance savings clause, on
its face, saves state law conferring causes of action or affecting remedies that
regulate insurance, just as it does state mandated-benefits laws and other prescriptive measures that do so.").
254. Id. at 25 ("Thus, the general background of Section 502 (a) discussed in
Pilot Life does not in itself require that a state law that 'regulates insurance,'
and so comes within the terms of the savings clause, is nevertheless preempted
if it provides a state-law cause of action or remedy.").
255. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
256. Id. at 25. Franchise Tax Board addressed the § 502 conflict with the
savings clause in the context of removal jurisdiction and the possible application
of the "complete preemption" doctrine to ERISA. See infra text accompanying
notes 288-310.
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plans] 257
The underlying fact pattern necessary to raise the express preemption versus implied preemption issue occurs
whenever plan participants bring state law bad faith or unfair insurance practices claims against their ERISA plan insurers in states where those state law remedies are aimed
specifically at the insurance industry. The conflict is presented most clearly in diversity jurisdiction actions filed in
federal court, but asserting remedies under state insurance
law. In that circumstance, preemption is the only issue because federal court jurisdiction is satisfied by facts (diversity
of citizenship) unrelated to ERISA. When plan participants
pursue state law insurance remedies, such as bad faith or unfair insurance practices claims, in state court against ERISA
plan insurers, a confusing removal jurisdiction question often
appears. The inference that ERISA § 502 provides the exclusive remedies available to pursue claims for benefits from an
ERISA plan suggests that all ERISA claims within the scope
of § 502 present "federal questions" that defendants may prefer to litigate in federal court. The same implied preemption
versus express preemption conflict that is presented in the
diversity jurisdiction action remains at the heart of the federal question. However, courts have often overlooked this
core ERISA statutory construction problem in the analysis of
the rather unique "complete preemption" removal jurisdiction
context in which the issue is presented. 58
IV. THE SAVINGS CLAUSE AND COMPLETE PREEMPTION
The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution establishes that federal judicial authority "shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority."259 Implementing Article III, the United States Code provides that the federal dis-

A.

257. FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25.
258. See, e.g., Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207 (11th
Cir. 1999); Hardy v. Welch, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2000); Parra v.
John Alden Life Ins. Co., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
259. U.S. Const. art III, § 2.
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trict courts "shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
26
States.""
Further, the United States Code allows a defendant to remove to federal district court any action brought in
state court over which the federal court has original jurisdiction, even where there is concurrent jurisdiction in state and
federal court.2 6' Viewing these federal rules in combination, it
is apparent that federal courts may exercise subject matter
jurisdiction whenever a case presents a federal question.
However, the mere presence of a federal question does not require a plaintiff to litigate in federal court.262 Can a defendant, sued in state court under state law theories, force a
plaintiff into federal court merely by alerting the federal court
to federal law issues, for example, ERISA preemption, which
may become involved in the case?
The primary governing principle developed by the Supreme Court for determining removal based upon federal
question jurisdiction is known as the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. 63 The well-pleaded complaint rule recognizes
that plaintiffs should be masters of their own theories of their
cases. 264 As described by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. An260. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. V 1976). The Supreme Court has determined
that the scope of cases "arising under" the laws of the United States under the
Supremacy Clause is broader than the scope of cases "arising under" the laws of
the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, despite the similarity in the
language of the two sections. Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S.
480, 495 (1983). See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824)
(holding that the Supremacy Clause permits Congress to extend federal question to any case where federal law potentially "forms an ingredient" of the
claim). See also FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8-12, for a concise history of the
jurisdictional section.
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
262. ERISA preemption undeniably presents a federal question for purposes
of Article III subject matter jurisdiction (see Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,
216 n.2 (2000)); however, fixing § 1331 jurisdiction presents a more difficult
problem when a plaintiff sues in state court under state law, but a defendant
asserts a federal defense. See Karen A. Jordan, The Complete Preemption Dilemma: A Legal Process Perspective, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 927, 940 (1996).

263. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S.
Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1983). Defendants, of course, may also remove suits filed
in state court if there is complete diversity of citizenship among all the plaintiffs
and all of the defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
264. See Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ("Of
course, the party who brings the suit is master to decide what law he will rely
upon.") (Holmes, J.).
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derson,
[w]hether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a
law or treaty of the United States,.

.

. must be determined

from what necessarily appears in the plaintiffs statement
of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses
which it is thought the defendant may interpose.265
If the allegations stated on the face of a well-pleaded complaint present only state law claims, removal is generally improper, even if federal law might provide an affirmative defense to the state court action.66 Consequently, the Supreme
Court has held that a defendant's assertion of removal jurisdiction based upon ERISA's express preemption language,
without more, cannot form the basis of federal court removal
jurisdiction. 67
The Complete PreemptionException to the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule
The issue becomes more complex, however, in ERISA
cases because the structure and comprehensiveness of
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions suggest that Congress
intended § 502 to provide the exclusive vehicle for enforceB.

ment of ERISA claims for benefits. 2 " The Court has estab-

265. 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914). See also Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n.6 (1986) ("Jurisdiction may not be sustained on
a theory that the plaintiff has not advanced.").
266. See FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13, where the Court stated,
As an initial proposition, then, the law that creates the cause of action
is state law, and original federal jurisdiction is unavailable unless it
appears that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a
necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims, or that one or
the other claim is "really" one of federal law.
Id. (internal quotations omitted); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridan, 299
U.S. 109, 116 (1936) ("By unimpeachable authority, a suit brought upon a state
statute does not arise under an act of Congress or the Constitution of the United
States because prohibited thereby.").
267. Specifically, the Court noted,
[S]ince 1887 it has been settled law that a case may not be removed to
federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of
pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiffs complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.
FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 14.
268. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987). But see Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25-27 (explaining that Congress did not intend § 502 to en-

162

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

lished an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, known
as the "complete preemption" doctrine, which may govern the
removal question in ERISA cases when a plan participant
sues in state court and seeks a state law remedy that falls
within the scope of ERISA § 502.269 The complete preemption
doctrine applies when the Supreme Court determines that
Congress intended a federal statute, which creates a federal
claim for relief, to so dominate a particular field of claims that
the federal remedy is exclusive. Under the complete preemption doctrine, any state law claim for relief within the scope of
the federally dominated field of claims is "re-characterized"
and converted into a federal cause of action.270
The concept of complete preemption is fairly elusive." '
Judges often complain that the use of the "preemption" label
to identify complete preemption is a misnomer."2 Ordinary
conflict or field preemption, sometimes referred to by courts
together as "conflict" preemption, 271 typically appears as an
affirmative defense, challenging the authority of a state law
to provide the rule of decision that may control the legal responsibilities between parties. In contrast, complete preemption is a jurisdictional matter, which operates as a corollary to
the well-pleaded complaint rule. 74 One court suggests that
"[p reemption is what wipes out the state law, but the foundation of removal [under complete preemption] is the creation of
federal law to replace state law.2 75 The inference of an excluvelop entirely all causes related to an ERISA-governed employee benefits plan).
269. See generally Jordan, supra note 262.
270. See Speciale v. Seybold, 147 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 1998); Jass v. Prudential
Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996).
271. A thorough critique of the complete preemption doctrine as applied by
the Supreme Court in all its permutations is beyond the scope of this article.
Many scholars have addressed the issue, however, in volumes of thoughtful
analysis. See, e.g., Robert A. Cohen, Note, UnderstandingPreemption Removal
Under ERISA 502, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 578 (1997); Jordan, supra note 262; Richard E. Levy, Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the
Well-Pleaded ComplaintRule, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 634 (1984).
272. See Bartholet v. Reishasuer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.
1992); Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 943 n.1 (7th Cir. 1989).
273. See Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 1995) (conflict preemption); Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1998) (ordinary preemption).
274. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).
275. Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.
1992). Courts describing the complete preemption doctrine use language reminiscent of the field preemption wing of implied preemption. Field preemption
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sive federal remedy provides the crucial element that distin276 If
guishes complete preemption from ordinary preemption.
a state law remedy falls within the scope of a federal remedial
scheme, removal jurisdiction exists because the state law
remedy is vaporized. Essentially, it ceases to exist-it never
did exist, and the claim is necessarily recast as federal.
Under the complete preemption doctrine, federal law is
277 Consesaid to displace state law, not necessarily replace it.
quently, the Supreme Court has observed that an equivalent
substitute federal remedy is not a prerequisite for complete
preemption.2 78 But there must be some federal remedy available, even if the remedy is not equivalent, because complete
preemption deals in remedies. Where the federal remedy is
exclusive, and displaces all state law claims within the parameters of the federal remedy, federal question jurisdiction
exists to justify removal of a state court filed action.
In sum, complete preemption is a "super" species of preemption,27 9 jurisdictional in nature, reserved for that rare
occurs when a federal statute so comprehensively regulates a particular subject
area that there can be no room for even supplemental state laws to provide governance over the exclusively federal subject. It is also arguable that complete
preemption imitates conflict preemption rules. A state remedies law that falls
within the scope of an express federal remedial scheme may literally conflict
with the federal remedy, or may so frustrate federal policy that the state law
stands as an obstacle to the implementation of the federal scheme. See Bogan,
supra note 28, at 960-63.
276. When the Supreme Court perceives that a federal statute totally displaces state law remedies arising from contracts subject to comprehensive federal regulation, preemption becomes a jurisdictional matter, rather than a device to direct what law provides the rule of decision in a case. See Rice v.
Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639-43 (7th Cir. 1995).
277. See Caterpiller Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
278. In Caterpillar,the Supreme Court briefly discussed whether complete
preemption required that a federal remedy replace the displaced state law remedy as a perquisite for finding complete preemption. The Ninth Circuit ruled,
"[A] state law cause of action has been 'completely pre-empted' when federal law
both displaces and supplements the state law-that is, when federal law provides both a superseding remedy replacing the state cause of action and preempts the state law cause of action." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 786 F.2d 928,
932 (1986). The CaterpillarSupreme Court stated, "This analysis is squarely
contradicted by our decision in Avco Corp. v. Machinists. We there held that a §
301 claim was properly removed to federal court although, at the time, the relief
sought by the plaintiff could be obtained only in state court." Caterpillar,482
U.S. at 391 (citations omitted).
279. See Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 1211 (11th
Cir. 1999); Hobbs v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1299,
1302 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
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situation where the Supreme Court determines that Congress
intended the federal enactment to displace all state law
causes of action within the scope of the federal statutory
claim. To justify removal, the federal court reconstructs the
complaint to allege a federal claim for relief. The fiction of
"recasting" the plaintiffs complaint alters the court's
perspective on the parties' pleadings, so that instead of the answer
suggesting federal question jurisdiction, the court pretends
that the complaint states a claim for relief within the scope of
the federal act.28 ° The difficulty in applying the doctrine lies
in defining the border between state laws that do, and those
that do not, fit within the "scope" of the federal remedial
scheme.
Specifically for the purposes of this article focusing
on ERISA's savings clause, does a state-filed claim under a
law that regulates insurance fall within the scope of claims
that Congress intended ERISA § 502 to completely preempt?
C.

Complete Preemption Under ERISA
Prior to ERISA, the Supreme Court had only applied the
complete preemption doctrine to claims arising under § 301 of
the LMRA.28 2 In the seminal case, Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge
280. See generally Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266 (3rd Cir.
2001); Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242 (3rd Cir. 2001); Lyons v. Phillip Morris Inc., 225 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2000); NGS Am., Inc. v. Jefferson, 218 F.3d 519
(6th Cir. 2000); In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3rd Cir. 1999); Copling v. Container Store, Inc., 174 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1999); Butero v. Royal
Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 1999); Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1998); Speciale v. Seybold, 147 F.3d 612 (7th
Cir. 1998); Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1998); Franklin v. QHG
of Gadsden, Inc., 127 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 1997); Franklin H. Williams Ins.
Trust v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 144 (2nd Cir. 1995); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d
637 (7th Cir. 1995); Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 1995); Harris v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1994); Bartholet
v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1992); Hardy v. Welch, 135
F. Supp. 2d 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2000); Tovey v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 42 F.
Supp. 2d 919 (W.D. Mo. 1999); Parra v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 22 F. Supp. 2d
1360 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
281. See Bartholet, 953 F.2d at 1075, where the court stated,
The difficulty-what makes [complete preemption] a darling of judges
but a bane of practice-is that national law never fully occupies a field.
Although ERISA may be the most comprehensive of the occupying
statutes, it contains exceptions ... And no matter how thoroughly federal law has suffused a body of rules, there is a border with the rest of
the law; cases close to the border create difficult problems.
Id. See also Bogan, supra note 28, at 960-63, 1022-24.
282. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987). The first lower
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28 3
No. 735, International Ass'n of Machinists, the Supreme
Court held that Congress intended § 301 of the LMRA to provide the exclusive remedy for all contract claims arising from
284 The Court has
a collectively bargained labor agreement.
since extended the Avco doctrine to ERISA because ERISA's
legislative history indicates that Congress modeled the civil
enforcement provisions in ERISA § 502 upon § 301 of the
LMRA.28 5 Complete preemption under ERISA, however, is
more complicated than complete preemption under LMRA §
301. ERISA includes express preemption language, not present in the LMRA, which bears on the extent of Congress' intent to displace state law remedies under ERISA § 502.286
In FranchiseTax Board of California v. ConstructionLa2 87
borers Vacation Trust for Southern California, the Supreme
Court first addressed the interplay of express ERISA preemption under § 514 and implied preemption under § 502 in the
context of removal jurisdiction. The Franchise Tax Board is a
California agency charged with enforcement of the state's
personal income tax laws.288 Under California law, the Tax
Board may require any person or entity in possession of assets belonging to a delinquent taxpayer to withhold a taxpayer's property and transmit the amount of tax owed by the
taxpayer to the Tax Board.2" The Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California (the "Trust") is an
ERISA welfare benefit plan that held funds in trust for several union workers who owed money to the State of California

court case to allow removal based on federal preemption was Fay v. America
Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), which held that federal law preempts the field of claims arising from collectively bargained labor
agreements under LMRA § 301).
283. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
284. See id. Avco contained very little analysis, and did not even refer to the
well-pleaded complaint rule. See also Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
285. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 64-67. The Supreme Court has now also applied
the complete preemption doctrine to cases arising under the Railway Labor Act.
See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994).
286. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66.
287. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
288. Id. at 5.
289. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 18670 (West 2001). The Trust could have been

held liable for the taxpayer obligation upon its refusal to obey the levy. See
FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5 (citing CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 18672 (West
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for back taxes.29 °
After accepting service of a notice of levy from the Tax
Board, the Trust received advice from the Department of Labor detailing the Trust's responsibilities regarding the levy
under ERISA.29 ' The Department of Labor declared that "the
process of any State judicial or administrative agency seeking
to levy for unpaid taxes or unpaid unemployment insurance
contributions upon benefits due a participant or beneficiary
under the Plan is pre-empted under ERISA § 514. "292

The

Trust refused to honor the levy, in reliance on the Department of Labor opinion that ERISA preempted California's
authority to levy against an ERISA plan.293
The Franchise Tax Board sued the Trust in state court
under state law theories, including California's Declaratory
Judgment statute, seeking to establish California's right to
levy against trust assets in order to collect taxes owed to the
state by employee participants in the vacation plan.294 The
Trust removed the action to federal court, asserting that
ERISA preemption provided federal question jurisdiction.299
The district court denied the Tax Board's motion to remand,
but then ruled that ERISA did not preempt the state's power
to levy on funds held in trust by the vacation plan.29 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that ERISA expressly preempted (under § 514) the California tax law authorizing the
State's attempt to levy against the plan.297 In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Tang questioned the original exercise of fed-

290. FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 3-5.
291. Id. at 5 n.4.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 5-6.
295. Id. at 7. The Trust was considered a California citizen for jurisdictional
purposes; consequently, diversity of citizenship could not form the basis of federal court jurisdiction. See id. at 8.
296. Id. at 7. The district court ruling seems particularly incongruous. The
court held that an action filed in state court, where state law controls, could be
removed to federal court and be litigated in that forum. See Harris v. Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that even
when not suggested by any of the parties, federal courts must always be aware
of their subject matter jurisdiction, and must dispose of cases where jurisdiction
is lacking).
297. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d
1307 (9th Cir. 1982).
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eral question jurisdiction by the district court. 9 ' Judge Tang
would have remanded the matter to state court under the
well-pleaded complaint rule.29
The Supreme Court focused on the issue of federal question jurisdiction raised by Judge Tang, but not addressed in
the circuit court's majority opinion. Applying the wellpleaded complaint rule, the Court decided that the Tax
Board's claim was not within the removal jurisdiction of 28
United States Code § 1441, and therefore reversed the circuit
court decision, with instructions to remand the action to state
court."' In so doing, the Court did not decide whether ERISA
superseded California's tax laws under ERISA's express preemption clause; that question, said the Court, had to be addressed by the state court as a matter of the Trust's defense
to the state law claims.30 '
Explaining its rationale, the Supreme Court declared
that "Avco stands for the proposition that if a federal cause of
action completely preempts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law.""02 The Franchise
Tax Board Court, however, distinguished application of the
Avco rule arising under LMRA § 301 from the suggestion of
complete preemption under ERISA § 502, specifically because
the scope of § 502 is significantly more limited than the scope
of LMRA § 301. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice
Brennan wrote,
The phrasing of § 502 is instructive. Section 502 (a) specifies which persons-participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labor-may bring actions for particular kinds of relief. It neither creates nor expressly
denies any cause of action in favor of state governments,
to enforce tax levies or for any other purpose. It does not
purport to reach every question relating to plans covered
by ERISA. Furthermore, § 514 (b)(2)(A) of ERISA [the
savings clause] makes clear that Congress did not intend
to pre-empt entirely every state cause of action relating to
298. See id. at 1310 (Tang, J., dissenting).
299. See id.
300. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust 463 U.S. 1,
27-28 (1983).
301. See FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 7.
302. Id. at 23-24.
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such plans. With important, but express limitations, it
states that "nothing in this subchapter shall be construed
to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." In contrast, § 301 (a) of the LMRA applies to all "[suits] for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
effecting commerce ... or between any such organizations .,

Franchise Tax Board teaches several lessons. First, the
Court emphasized, despite ERISA's legislative history, that
the comparison between LMRA § 301 and ERISA § 502 is imperfect, at best, because the LMRA enforcement provision is
not expressly modified by a savings clause. °4 Second,
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions do not provide the "sole
launching ground" for all litigation involving an ERISA
plan." 5 Of particular importance in Franchise Tax Board was
the fact that California's appointed agent to collect taxes
could not bring an action as plaintiff under § 502.30 Section
502 only allows plan participants or beneficiaries, ERISA fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labor to pursue claims." 7
303. Id. at 25. The trickiest issue confronting the Court in Franchise Tax
Board involved the nature of the relief sought by the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court remarked that whether plaintiffs declaratory judgment count necessarily
raised a federal question sufficient to trigger removal jurisdiction posed a difficult problem because the determination of the preemption issue was a necessary
element of the declaratory judgment claim. Indeed, the only question in dispute
between the parties concerned the rights and responsibilities of the Trust under
ERISA. The answer to the question depended upon the unique relief provided
by declaratory judgment. See id. at 14-22. Previously, the Supreme Court had
held that "if, but for the availability of the declaratory judgment procedure, the
federal claim would arise only as a defense to a state created action, jurisdiction
is lacking." Id. at 16 (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S.
667 (1950) (quoting 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2767 (2d ed. 1983).
304. See FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24.
305. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 377 (1999).
306. See FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25-26.
307. Id. at 24 n. 26. The Court continued,
ERISA does not provide an alternative cause of action in favor of the
State to enforce its rights, while § 301 expressly supplied the plaintiff
in Avco with a federal cause of action to replace its pre-empted state
contract claim ...ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled to
seek relief under § 502; it does not provide anyone other than participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an express cause of action for a
declaratory judgment on the issues in this case. A suit for similar relief
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Third, the Avco rule may apply to ERISA, but only if courts
restrict the field of remedies occupied by ERISA to those
remedies that fall within the more limited scope of § 502.308
Even claims seemingly within the parameters of § 502 will
not be removable to federal court if the state law remedy at
issue operates as an insurance regulation under ERISA's
savings clause. °9
Several years after Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme
Court announced in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux"° that
state law remedies asserted in an action connected with an
ERISA governed-employee benefit plan conflicted with
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions because Congress intended ERISA § 502 to provide the exclusive vehicle for plan
participants to pursue benefits allegedly due from an ERISA
plan.3 1' Pilot Life did not involve removal jurisdiction issues
because the Pilot Life plaintiff originated his action in federal
court based upon diversity of citizenship.3 12 On the same day
the Court decided Pilot Life, however, the Court also decided
a case that did involve federal question removal jurisdiction
under the complete preemption doctrine in an ERISA context.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,313 a plan
participant sued his ERISA disability benefits plan insurer
and his employer in state court under state law theories
seeking to recover benefits allegedly due to him under the
plan, plus emotional distress damages arising from the
breach of contract.314 Similar to the Pilot Life action, the state
law remedies pursued by Mr. Taylor were not aimed specifically at the insurance industry, and therefore did not impliby some other party does not "arise under" that provision.
Id. at 26-27.
308. Id.
309. See id. at 24-25. The Court explained,
It may be that, as with § 301 as interpreted in Avco, any state action
coming within the scope of § 502 (a) of ERISA would be removable to
federal district court, even if an otherwise adequate state cause of a action were pleaded without reference to federal law. It does not follow,
however, that either of appellant's claims in this case comes within the
scope of one of ERISA's causes of action.
Id.
310. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
311. Id. at 57.
312. Id. at 43.
313. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
314. Id. at 61.
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cate ERISA's savings clause. 15 The defendants removed the
action alleging federal question jurisdiction over the disability
benefits claim and pendant jurisdiction over the remaining
claims.16
The Supreme Court attempted to address the issue specifically left open in Franchise Tax Board, that is, whether
the Avco complete preemption doctrine should be extended to
claims within the scope of ERISA § 502.17 The Taylor Court
held that Congress intended to make causes of action within
the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions removable
to federal court in the same manner that LMRA § 301 completely preempts state law actions."' The Taylor Court found
that the state law claims presented by the plaintiff were, in
essence, merely complaints with the manner in which his
ERISA disability plan processed his claim for benefits and
could have been brought under ERISA § 502.319 Because the
claim fell within the scope of that section, and since Taylor, as
a plan participant, was eligible to sue under § 502, the defendants properly removed the action to federal court under the
complete preemption doctrine. 2 °
While the Court said it was addressing the issue left open

315. Id. at 62.
316. Id. The district court found removal proper and then entered summary
judgment for the defendants. Id. But see Taylor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 763 F.2d
216, 219 (6th Cir. 1986). The Sixth Circuit reversed because the well-pleaded
complaint rule precluded removal jurisdiction on the basis of a federal defense.
317. See Metro. Life v. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 64.
318. See id. at 66. See also FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. 1 at 23. Here, the
Court stated,
The necessary ground of decision [in Avco] was that the pre-emptive
force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of
action "for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the
absence of§ 301.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoted in Taylor, 481 U.S. at 64).
319. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 64.
320. ERISA § 502 does not provide a federal remedy equivalent to the emotional distress remedy available to Mr. Taylor in state court since the state
remedy would have allowed Taylor to recover extra-contractual damages. Regardless of the dissimilarities in the measure of damages under the state and
federal causes, the Taylor Court found the state law claim to be within the scope
of § 502. Without discussing the issue, the Court held that ERISA displaced
Mr. Taylor's state law remedies, even though the federal statute did not replace
the state remedy with an equivalent remedy. See generally Taylor, 481 U.S. 58.

2001]

ERISA PREEMPTION

in FranchiseTax Board, Taylor only addressed part of the issue. " ' Taylor, like Pilot Life, did not involve ERISA's savings
clause because the state law theories Mr. Taylor pursued did
not spring from remedies that targeted the insurance industry. 2 ' Consequently, all that Taylor tells us is that in the
field of all claims which could be brought under ERISA § 502,
excepting state law claims that provide remedies specifically
targeting the insurance industry, the state law causes will be
transmogrified.
One circuit court that has addressed the § 502 versus §
514(b) conflict in the removal context determined that
ERISA's express savings clause trumps implied preemption
under ERISA § 502. However, like the cases discussed previously where courts found that § 502 implied preemption de2 Franklin H. Wilfeated ERISA's express savings clause,"
liams Insurance Trust v. Travelers Insurance Co.12 4 also fails
to fully analyze the conflict issues. In Franklin H. Williams,
the Franklin H. Williams Insurance Trust ("the Trust")
owned a group life insurance policy made available to employees of Chemical Bank and issued by Travelers Insurance
("Travelers"). 25 Several months after Mr. Williams died, the
Trust submitted a claim to Travelers seeking the principal
amount of the life insurance coverage, plus interest from the
date of Mr. Williams's death pursuant to New York insurance
law. 26 Travelers only offered to pay interest from the date
the Trust presented the insurance claim, rather than from
the date of death. 7 Unable to resolve the conflict over the
321. See id. at 64.
322. Franchise Tax Board remains the only Supreme Court opinion that discusses complete preemption under ERISA § 502 in relation to ERISA's savings
clause.
323. See supra discussion accompanying notes 225-33.
324. 50 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1995).
325. Id. at 146.
326. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3214(c) (McKinney 2001), which provides as follows:
If no action has been commenced, interest upon the principal sum paid
to the beneficiary ... shall be computed daily at the rate of interest
currently paid by the insurer on proceeds left under the interest settlement option, from the date of the death of an insured ... in connection with a death claim on a policy of life insurance ... to the date of
payment and shall be added to and be a part of the total sum paid.
Id.
327. FranklinH. Williams, 50 F. 3d at 146.
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amount of interest due, the Trust sued in state court seeking
compensatory and punitive damages under New York law." 8
After Travelers removed the action to federal court on the
ground that the action was one to recover benefits under an
ERISA plan, the Trust moved to remand.129 The District
Court for the Southern District of New York denied the motion to remand, even though the interest law was saved from
preemption as a law that regulates insurance, because the
plaintiffs state law complaint fell within the scope of ERISA §
502.30
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that when a law is
saved from ERISA preemption under ERISA § 514, removal is
improper. The court found that Pilot Life was distinguishable
from the Trust's action because Pilot Life did not involve any
interplay between the savings clause and § 502."l' The court
explained that following Taylor, the Second Circuit adopted a
test for complete preemption in Smith v. Dunham-Bush,
Inc.332 as follows: "A claim styled as a state common law cause
of action is removable under ERISA if it 'relates to' an employee benefit plan within the meaning of section 514(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a), and falls within the scope of the statute's
civil enforcement provisions, found in section 502(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1131(a).",333 The Franklin H. Williams court added
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. The district court held that the New York insurance law was saved from
preemption, but that ERISA § 502 nevertheless preempted any private right of
action that could be brought under New York Insurance law § 3214(c), because §
502 provided the exclusive remedy for all claims for benefits arising from an
ERISA benefits plan. See Franklin H. Williams Ins. Trust v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
847 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The Trust sued under state law for breach of
contract, conversion, and alleged a private right of action under a New York insurance law that required life insurance companies to pay interest on benefits
from the date of death. Id. at 24. Though the Trust sought both compensatory
and punitive damages, it does not appear that an unfair insurance practices
claim or common law bad faith claim was presented. Neither the district court
nor the Second Circuit viewed any of the state law remedies as laws that regulate insurance. Id. at 26-27. The savings clause issue focused on application of
the interest on life insurance contracts law as providing the rule of decision in
the case. Id. at 26. The question of whether the interest on insurance law provided a private right of action that could be viewed as a separate insurance
remedies law was not clearly addressed. See id. at 23.
331. FranklinH. Williams, 50 F.3d at 149.
332. 959 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1992).
333. FranklinH. Williams, 50 F.3d at 149 (quoting Smith, 959 F.2d at 8).
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that the reference to "relates to" in the Smith opinion was not
meant to exclude the application of the savings clause in
evaluating complete preemption; the Smith case left the savings clause reference out merely because that case did not involve a savings clause issue. Franklin H. Williams then
modified the test to hold that a state law claim is completely
preempted if first, the state law is preempted under § 514,
that is, the claim both "relates to" an employee benefit plan
and is not saved from preemption by § 514(b)(2)(A), and second, the law falls within the scope of § 502."'
The Second Circuit agreed that the New York interest
law regulated insurance and, therefore, was expressly saved
from preemption."' Then, overruling the district court, the
Second Circuit declared, "It would be quixotic to rule that a
claim under a state statute that is saved from ERISA preemption, with the result that the claim may not be removed
to federal court, may nonetheless be enforced only via ERISA
provisions and remedies."336
If the Second Circuit in FranklinH. Williams Insurance
Trust believed that the New York interest on insurance contracts law provided an implied remedy, the court was not
clear. But assuming that was the court's approach, I would
agree with the result reached in FranklinH. Williams, but for
a reason not explored in the Second Circuit opinion. State insurance law remedies do not fit within the scope of claims
completely preempted under ERISA § 502 because the inference of preemption under § 502 is modified by the express
language of the savings clause. 3 7
If the New York insurance law does not provide a private
right of action, then the district court was correct to hold that
removal was proper. The saved insurance law would still
provide the rule of decision to control the interest issue, but §
502 would provide the remedy. As subsequently made clear
in UNUM Life Insurance Co. v. Ward,33 the insurance law
would have effectively added a mandatory contract term to
the ERISA plan, comparable to the way the notice-prejudice
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

FranklinH. Williams, 50 F.3d at 149.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
See supra statutory construction discussion accompanying notes 234-43.
526 U.S. 358 (1999).
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rule in UNUM added a term to the insurance contract in that
case, but the plan participant's
relief would have to come un33 9
benefits.
for
claim
502
§
der a
Furthermore, the FranklinH. Williams case confuses the
savings clause issues. The circuit court seemingly failed to
identify that the fact pattern presented two separate savings
clause questions. The first question was whether the New
York interest law regulates insurance; that question presents
a straight § 514 problem. The second issue was whether the
state law remedy to enforce the interest on insurance contracts law was also a law that regulates insurance; that question presents a potential conflict between the savings clause
and § 502. If the New York interest law provided a private
right of action to enforce the law's provisions, and the remedy
therefore only applied against insurance companies, the remedy would be saved from preemption because ERISA's express exemption from preemption for laws that regulate insurance defeats the implied preemption of state law remedies
under § 502. If general contract law provides the remedy to
enforce the New York interest on insurance contracts law,
then there would be no savings clause conflict with § 502, and
§ 502 would preempt the state law remedy.
D. Defining the Scope of ERISA § 502
Given that ERISA only preempts state law claims within
the scope of § 502, it is incumbent on federal courts to define
the scope of § 502 remedies. The Supreme Court has not yet
had occasion to identify all of the boundaries of § 502 claims,
but the Court has provided some guidance in cases addressing the similar limitations of LMRA § 301. Analysis of Supreme Court cases involving implied preemption or complete
339. Plaintiff asserted that a private right of action was implied from the insurance law. See Franklin H. Williams Ins. Trust v. Travelers Ins. Co., 847 F.
Supp. 23, 25-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). If the New York insurance law did not provide
a private right of action to enforce the law, the Trust could have sued under
ERISA § 502 to recover benefits due under the plan. In that action, the New
York insurance law would have been saved from preemption as a law that
regulates insurance and would have provided the "rule of decision" to determine
what benefits were due, similar to how the notice-prejudice rule in UNUM provided the "rule of decision" in that case. The Trust would have recovered interest from the date of death as provided in the New York law under ERISA § 502,
but the Trust would not have been able to recover punitive damages under
ERISA's civil enforcement scheme. See UNUM, 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
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preemption under LMRA § 301, therefore, provides a good
starting point to identify state law claims that may fall
within the implied preemptive scope of ERISA § 502, but
ERISA's savings clause implications must then be added to
the mix.34 ° Supplementing the rationale of the LMRA § 301
cases with ERISA's distinguishing characteristics, a working
formula to define the scope of ERISA § 502 can then be identified. First, § 502 will preempt state law claims that, however
artfully drafted, really seek to recover benefits under an
ERISA plan-breach of contract actions.34' Second, § 502 may
also preempt non-contract state law claims that require some
substantial analysis or interpretation of plan contract
terms. 42 Third, the mere fact that an ERISA plan may be re340. One of the early cases interpreting LMRA § 301, Textile Workers Union
of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), held that § 301
authorized federal courts to fashion a body of federal law that would control the
enforcement of collectively bargained contracts. Id. at 456-57. See also Local
174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962) ("[The] dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be
paramount in the area covered by the statute [so that] issues raised in suits of a
kind covered by § 301 [are] to be decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy."). Lincoln Mills instructed that courts could resort to state law, if
compatible with the purposes of § 301, to establish the best rule to effectuate
the federal policy, but any state law applied would be absorbed as federal law
and would not form the basis of any independent source of rights or privileges.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456-57. Justice Frankfurter was not impressed. His
dissent complains that "by attributing to [§ 3011 an occult content," the majority
opinion "transmuted" a plainly procedural section "into a mandate to the federal
courts to fashion a whole body of substantive law." Id. at 461-62 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
A series of § 301 cases then followed Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,
InternationalAss'n of Machinists, which provide some definition of those remedies that fall within the scope of § 301 for complete preemption removal jurisdiction purposes. While § 301 does not provide guidance regarding complete
preemption of state laws that regulate insurance, cases interpreting § 301 do
help to define the extent of laws that fall within the scope of the remedial
scheme in comparison to other claims.
341. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S.
557 (1968) (holding that the complete preemption doctrine allows cases to be
removed to federal court by recasting state law actions to enforce labor contracts into claims under § 301).
342. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985). In Lueck, an
injured worker filed a state law claim against his employer and the insurance
company that administered his disability benefits program, alleging bad faith
harassment in the processing of his benefits claim. Id. at 206. The disability
insurance contract was provided as part of a collectively bargained labor agreement. Id. at 204. The Supreme Court held that when the resolution of a statelaw claim is substantially dependant upon analysis of a collectively-bargained
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ferred to in a matter peripheral to the controversy, for example, to calculate damages in a non-contract state law claim
where the terms of the plan are not disputed, will not provide
a basis for complete preemption.343 Additionally, Franchise
Tax Board instructs that § 502 does not mimic LMRA § 301 in
labor contract, the claim falls within the scope of LMRA § 301, and must either
be treated as a § 301 claim, or be dismissed as pre-empted by federal laborcontract law. Id. at 221. Specifically, the Lueck court stated, "If the policies
that animate § 301 are to be given their proper range, . . . the pre-emptive effect
of § 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations." See id. at 210.
Because Lueck's tort claim was "inextricably intertwined" with the labor contract, and because it was a matter of federal contract interpretation to decide
whether there was an obligation under the contract to provide payments in a
timely manner, the state law bad faith claim fell within the ambit of § 301 and
was, therefore, preempted. Id. at 219.
In CaterpillarInc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), the Supreme Court
further clarified the scope of § 301 preemption in a case specifically applying the
complete preemption doctrine. Id. at 392-93. In Caterpillar,several management level employees alleged that Caterpillar promised them they would be offered employment at other Caterpillar plants if the employer closed the plant
where they worked. Id. at 389. Contrary to that promise, Caterpillar demoted
the plaintiffs to positions covered by a collective-bargaining agreement, and
then fired the complaining employees as part of a plant closing in California.
Id. The former employees sued in state court alleging breach of the alleged private employment contracts. Id. at 390. Caterpillar removed the action to federal court asserting that any such private employment contracts had merged
into the collective-bargaining agreement, and that all claims for breach of the
labor agreement were completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. The Supreme Court held that removal was improper. Id. at 391. While § 301 governs
claims founded directly upon rights created by collective-bargaining agreements
and claims substantially dependent on analysis of such agreements, the Court
found that the plaintiffs state law claims under the alleged oral contracts did
not require any interpretation of the labor contract in order to determine the
validity of the state law claims. Id. at 394.
343. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994) ("[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collectivebargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation
plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.").
In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), the
Supreme Court upheld a state law retaliatory discharge claim in the face of a §
301 preemption challenge. Id. at 401. The employee's collective bargaining
agreement prevented her employer from discharging her without just cause. Id.
After plaintiff was fired, allegedly in retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim, she brought suit under an Illinois statute making such employment
practices unlawful. Id. at 402. The Supreme Court found that § 301 did not
preempt the state law action, even where the factual inquiry into the state law
claim necessarily overlapped the factual inquiry into whether the termination
was for just cause under the labor contract. Id. at 410. The Court held that §
301 did not preempt the state law claim because none of the elements of the
state law claim required an interpretation of the labor contract. Id. at 405-06.
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all respects: unlike the LMRA, ERISA's express preemption
language modifies ERISA's civil enforcement provisions and §
502 only offers relief to limited specified parties. Considering
Franchise Tax Board in conjunction with the LMRA § 301
cases, complete preemption in ERISA cases therefore should
not apply to state law claims brought by parties ineligible to
sue under § 502, and complete preemption should not apply to
state insurance law claims, which are expressly saved from
ERISA preemption.
Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. and Corporate
Health Insurance v. Texas Department of Insurance
Following Taylor, complete preemption flourished in
claims directed at ERISA-governed Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs"), Managed Care Organizations, and
ERISA plan Utilization Review providers. Typical of the
health care benefit claims that defendants have removed to
federal court, and that federal courts then fictionalized into §
502 claims, have been causes based on utilization review determinations that some recommended medical procedure was
"experimental" or "not medically necessary."344 In many of
these cases courts struggle to define the line between utilization review decisions that determine either the "quality" (not
345
preempted) or "quantity" (preempted) of benefits provided.

E.

344. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.
1992).
345. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000); Pryzbowski v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266 (3rd Cir. 2001); Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d
242 (3rd Cir. 2000); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072 (8th
Cir. 2000); In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3rd Cir. 1999); Hull v.
Fallon, 188 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 1999); Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co.,
174 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 1999); Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003 (9th
Cir. 1998); Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir.
1997); Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996);
Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996);
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995); Spain v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 963
F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); Zimnoch v. ITT Hartford, No. 99-6594, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2846 (E.D. Pa. Mar.14, 2000); United Healthcare Ins. Co. v. Levy,
114 F. Supp. 2d 559 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Stewart v. Berry Family Health Ctr., 105
F. Supp. 2d 807 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Tutolo v. Independence Blue Cross, No. 98CV-5928, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6335 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1999); Lewis v. Aetna
U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (N.D. Okla. 1999); Crum v. Health
Alliance-Midwest, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (C.D. Ill. 1999); Moscovitch v.
Danbury Hosp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Conn. 1998); Huss v. Green Spring Health
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While these cases are vitally important to patients and figure
prominently in the current debate over competing "Patient
Protection" bills under consideration in Congress,34 6 the
"quality versus quantity" cases do not all present
causes of
action aimed specifically at the insurance industry.
In this article focusing on ERISA's savings clause and the
potential conflict between the savings clause and ERISA's
civil enforcement provisions, the most pertinent health care
benefit plan disputes are presented in two circuit court opinions, Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.3 47 and Corporate
348
Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance,
that consider ERISA's preemptive effect on separate state
"HMO reform" laws. The two circuit courts disagree on
whether an "independent review provision" within the HMO
reform laws provides an alternative remedy to ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Moran, the Seventh Circuit case that rejected the
alternative remedy rationale,3 49 and is considering a petition
for certiorari in Corporate Health, which found that ERISA
preempted the state law under § 502, even though the HMO
law regulated insurance. 5 ' If the Supreme Court finds that
independent review provisions in the HMO reform laws do
provide an alternative remedy that regulates insurance, the
Court will likely address the statutory construction conflict
involving ERISA's savings clause and ERISA § 502.
The Texas statute at issue in Corporate Health requires
health care plans to offer an independent review of any adverse determination by an insurer, HMO, or utilization reServ., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 400 (D. Del. 1998); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F.
Supp. 983 (E. D. Pa. 1990); Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889 (1998), petition for
reh'g denied, 1999 Pa. LEXIS 338 (1999), vacated and remanded by United
States Healthcare Sys. of Pa. Inc. v. Pa. Hosp. Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 1241 (2000);
Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 711 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1999). See also Patricia
Mullen Ochmann, Managed Care Organizations Manage to Escape Liability:
Why Issues of Quantity vs. Quality Lead to ERISA's Inequitable Preemption of
Claims, 34 AKRON L. REV. 571 (2001).

346. See supra note 24.
347. 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (June 29,
2001).
348. 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000), reh'g denied, 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000),
petitionfor cert. filed.
349. See Moran, 230 F.3d 959.
350. See CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d 526.

2001]

ERISA PREEMPTION

179

view agent that some recommended treatment is not medically necessary.35 ' Additionally, the statute requires that a
utilization review agent must comply with the independent
review organizations determination. 3 ' Similarly, the Illinois'
Health Maintenance Organization Act353 at issue in Moran
requires HMOs to submit to an independent physician review
when a patient's primary care doctor disagrees with the
HMO's conclusion that a recommended treatment is not
medically necessary. Like the Texas law, the Illinois statute
also directs the HMO to cover the treatment if the independ354
is necessary.
ent reviewer determines that the treatment
In Corporate Health, various insurers and HMO's filed
suit in federal district court seeking injunctive relief and a
declaration that ERISA preempted Texas Senate Bill 386."'
Circuit Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham wrote that the independent review portion of the Texas statute "related to"
ERISA, but also fell within the savings clause exception to
preemption for laws that regulate insurance.5 6 Judge Higginbotham continued, however, to analyze the independent
review portion of the Texas statute in relation to ERISA's
civil enforcement provisions.35 ' The Fifth Circuit determined
that the independent review provisions created an alternative
state law remedy that allowed plan participants to obtain
plan benefits in a manner that conflicted with ERISA § 502.358
Judge Higginbotham declared,
351. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.12A(a)(1) (Vernon 2000) (codified in 1997
at art. 20A.12(c)(1)).
352. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.58A § 6a(3) (Vernon 2000). HMO's are directed to follow the rules applicable to utilization review agents. See TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. art. 20A.12A(b) (West 2000).
353. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/1-1, 4-10 (West 2001).
354. Id. at § 4-10.
355. See Corporate Health Ins., 215 F.3d at 531. Senate Bill 386 is the

popular name for the Texas HMO reform law, and is codified as amendments to
various sections of the Texas Insurance Code. See id.
356. Id. at 537-38.
357. Id. at 538-39.

358. The court explained,
This [independent review scheme] creates an alternative mechanism

through which plan members may seek benefits due them under the
terms of the plan - the identical relief offered under [§ 502] of ERISA.
As such, the independent review provisions conflict with ERISA's exclusive remedy and cannot be saved by the savings clause.
Id. at 539.
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[E]ven if the [independent review] provisions would otherwise be saved, they may nonetheless be preempted if
they conflict with a substantive provision of ERISA. In Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, the Supreme Court held that "our understanding of the savings clause must be informed by the
legislative intent concerning [ERISA's] civil enforcement
provisions." The Court interpreted Congress's intent regarding the exclusivity of ERISA's enforcement scheme
very broadly, concluding that the scheme preempts not
only directly conflicting remedial schemes, but also supplemental state law remedies. Thus, the savings clause
does not operate if the state law at issue creates an alternative remedy for obtaining benefits under an ERISA
plan.359
Contrary to Judge Higginbotham's suggestion, Pilot Life
does not stand for the proposition that state remedies laws
that regulate insurance are nevertheless impliedly preempted
by ERISA § 502.360 Recall that in Pilot Life the Mississippi
remedies law at issue was not aimed at the insurance industry, and therefore was not saved from preemption.361 The
purpose of the sentence Judge Higginbotham quoted from Pilot Life was not to declare the winner in a contest between §
502 and the savings clause; that conflict was not presented in
Pilot Life. In Pilot Life, the Supreme Court referred to the
broad structure of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions
merely as evidence to support the Court's determination that
ERISA's savings clause should be construed narrowly.36 2 Pilot

Life nowhere intimates that the inference of preemption under § 502 more accurately reflects Congress's preemptive intentions than the statute's express preemption language.3 63
Importantly, the Fifth Circuit opinion fails to cite Franchise
Tax Board, and therefore, apparently did not consider the
guidance that case offers on how the Supreme Court might
approach the internal conflict between implied preemption
359. Id. at 538-39.
360. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 76-91.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
363. See supra Part III. As described in Part III of this paper, the Pilot Life
Court found that a state law remedy, which the Court expressly found to be outside the scope of the savings clause, conflicted with Congress's intent that
ERISA § 502 should provide the exclusive vehicle for plan participants to pursue claims within the ambit of that provision. See id.
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under § 502 and ERISA's express exception to preemption for
laws that regulate insurance. 4
In Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.,365 the Seventh
Circuit addressed Illinois' independent review statute in a
context that involved complete preemption removal jurisdiction. 36 Debra Moran sued her ERISA-governed HMO in state
court under state law to enforce compliance with an independent reviewers determination that a medical procedure
recommended by her primary care physician was medically
necessary. 367 The Seventh Circuit held that the state law
claim fell within the scope of ERISA § 502 because Ms. Moran
was seeking reimbursement for the costs of the medical procedure she underwent-that is, she was seeking benefits due
under the plan. 68 The court recast her complaint to state a
claim under ERISA § 502, and therefore, found removal
proper under the complete preemption doctrine.369 The Moran
court then went on to consider whether ERISA expressly preempted the independent review provisions under ERISA §
514.70 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit that
the independent review law regulates insurance, but then
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's depiction of the law as providing an alternative remedy.'
The Moran court reasoned that the independent review
statute was an insurance regulation. 2 Under Illinois law, as
in most states, the provisions of the state's insurance code are
deemed to be incorporated into every insurance policy. 73 As
such, the independent review statute merely added a mandatory contract term to the insurance policy. 74 Moran then
364. See FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25.
365. 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (June 29,
2001).
366. See id. at 965.
367. Id. at 964.
368. Id. at 965.
369. Id. at 966.
370. See id. at 968.
371. See Moran, 230 F.3d at 971.
372. See id. at 969. Both the Fifth Circuit in Corporate Health and the Seventh Circuit in Moran held that the HMO reform laws regulated insurance because the HMO's conduct the business of insurance in some aspects of their operation. See Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 536
(5th Cir. 2000); Moran, 230 F.3d at 969.
373. See supra note 131.
374. See Moran, 230 F.3d at 969. Very early in Supreme Court ERISA pre-
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compared the Illinois independent review statute to the notice-prejudice rule at issue in UNUM Life Insurance Co. v.
Ward.375 The Seventh Circuit found that the Illinois independent review law, like the notice-prejudice rule in UNUM,
provided the rule of decision that governed interpretation of
the plan contract, but the remedy for breach remained a
claim pursuant to ERISA § 502.76

In Moran, the Seventh Circuit did not address any conflict between § 502 and the savings clause because the court
held that the state law subject to the savings clause was not a
remedies law. 77 The two ERISA sections only come into conflict when a state insurance law provides remedies that are
not available under § 502. If the Supreme Court agrees with
the Fifth Circuit decision in CorporateHealth and finds that
the independent review law does provide an alternative remedy, and if the Court also finds that the independent review
law is a law that regulates insurance, then the Supreme
Court will have to decide the savings clause versus § 502 conflict when it considers Moran.
V.

CONCLUSION

ERISA preemption issues continue to befuddle attorneys
and judges, and continue to clog federal court dockets. The
Supreme Court, however, is slowly providing improved direction to litigants by maintaining a focus on the rule that courts
should be loath to preempt state laws regulating areas of traditional state governance. A number of lower courts have
taken direction from the Supreme Court's trend to closely
scrutinize any request to preempt state laws that regulate
non-pension employee benefit plans. Relying upon the Supreme Court's new, kinder ERISA preemption analysis, these
federal district court judges have re-visited the question of
ERISA's preemption of state law bad faith or unfair insurance
practices remedies and held that the state laws in question do
emption jurisprudence, the Supreme Court explained that states may indirectly
regulate ERISA plans by regulating the terms of insurance policies purchased
by plans to fund plan obligations. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 747 (1985).
375. 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
376. See Moran, 230 F.3d at 967. The Court had already recast Ms. Moran's
cause as a claim for benefits under § 502. See id.

377. Id. at 970.
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regulate insurance and, therefore, are saved from ERISA preemption.
Further direction is needed from the Supreme Court,
however, to instruct litigants concerning the interplay between ERISA's express savings clause and implied preemption under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. When the
reasonable interpretation of those two ERISA sections conflict
because a state insurance law provides an alternative remedy
not available under ERISA § 502, I suggest that the savings
clause, which expressly details that ERISA does not preempt
state insurance laws, must prevail over implied preemption
under ERISA § 502.

